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REINVENTING THE DEAL
I. INTRODUCTION-THE MODIFICATION PROBLEM
Modification is an accepted adjunct to the right to contract. It provides
a flexible and efficient mechanism for changing agreements in response to
altered circumstances in the performance stage of a contract. Some
modified (or "reinvented") contracts facilitate an efficient allocation of
resources, saving a deal that would otherwise have ended in an inefficient
breach. It does not follow, however, that courts should enforce all
modifications. In some cases, the reinvented contract is the product of
deceit, economic coercion, or the initiating party's ability to dictate
changes. Section 2-209 of the Uniform Commercial Code deals with
modifications to contracts for the sale of goods. The text of section 2-
209(1) states: "An agreement modifying a contract within this Article
needs no consideration to be binding."' The official comments to section
2-209 include the requirement of good faith, stating that modifications
"must meet the test of good faith imposed by this Act."' Although this
provision seems to intend to impose a good faith obligation on
modifications, it fails to elucidate what constitutes good faith in this
context, leaving the question to the discretion of the courts rather than
contextualizing the concept.3 Thus, courts are left to tackle the question of
how to determine whether a modification should be enforced. In attempting
to delineate enforceable from unenforceable modifications, courts have
formulated a variety of tests, but their efforts have failed to produce a
predictable or workable test for addressing the modification issue.' This
1. U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (1998).
2. See id. § 2-209 cmt. 2. Because most states do not adopt the official comments as part of
the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, see Sean Michael Hannaway, The Jurisprudence
and Judicial Treatment of the Comments to the Uniform Commercial Code, 75 CORNELLL. REV.
962, 974-86 (1990) (arguing for stronger judicial regard of a comment's authoritative value), an
initiating party may argue that Comment 2 fails to create law. Good faith is inapplicable to the
modification setting, this argument runs, because modification is a formation process rather than
a performance process. While courts have heretofore rejected this argument, the legislative history
of the process of revision of Article 2 may add fuel for the argument. The National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) proposed a version of § 2-209(1) that included
the good faith requirement in the text of the provision. Compare U.C.C. § 2-209(1) with U.C.C.
§ 2-210(a) (proposed NCCUSL draft, Nov. 1, 1996). If the requirement is again relegated to the
comment section in the final draft, an initiating party may argue that the drafters categorized
modification as outside the reach of the obligation of good faith.
3. See generally Christina L. Kunz, Frontispiece on Good Faith: A Functional Approach
Within the UCC, 16 WM. MrrCHELLL. REv. 1105, 1106-10 (1990) (noting the UCC's generalized
use of good faith).
4. Scholars have criticized section 2-209 for failing to provide a clear model for courts to
employ. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General
Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 1024 (1983); Robert A. Hillman, Contract
Modification Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 680, 699-700
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Article considers whether providing additional content to the concept of
good faith in this area of modification is possible or desirable.
A representative hypothetical illustrates the problem. Pursuant to a
contract with Madison County (Buyer), Steel Perfect (Seller) began
manufacturing steel beams for use by Buyer in the construction of a bridge.
Before the first delivery, Seller' called Buyer and stated that, because of an
increase in the price of iron used in manufacturing steel, Seller would not
perform the contract unless Buyer accepted a revised price term, sharing
the cost of the price increase. Worried about obtaining cover (a substitute
contract), Buyer agreed to the modified price, signed a written modification
of the price term in the contract document, and took delivery of the beams.
After construction of the bridge was complete, Buyer paid Seller the
original contract price, refused to pay the price adjustment, and asserted
that the modification was unfair, coercive, or otherwise unenforceable. In
response, Seller sued. Should a court enforce the price modification? What
standard should it apply in deciding this question?
If the facts indicate that a significant price increase actually occurred,
that the risk of such a price increase was not allocated to Seller,6 and that
Seller did not engage in coercive tactics, a court is likely to enforce the
(1982). Professor Farnsworth explored the ambiguity of the current version of the Code. See E.
Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 666, 675-76 (1963).
5. Much of this discussion speaks of the initiating party as the seller and the resisting party
as the buyer. While many cases in the modification context involve a request by a seller for an
enhanced price, the modification question can arise in the reverse setting. For example, abuyer may
seek a lower price for the goods or seek other concessions such as an increased quantity of goods,
higher quality goods, accommodations relating to payment terms ordelivery terms, or other matters
advantageous to Buyer.
6. In a general sense, the risk of a price increase is implicitly allocated to Seller and the risk
of a price decrease is implicitly allocated to Buyer. In the event of a price increase, Seller regrets
the contract, wishes he had not agreed to the lower sales price (i.e., lower than that which he could
obtain after the price rise), and wants out of the contract. Conversely, in the event of a price
decrease, Buyer regrets the contract, knowing that he now could obtain the same goods for a lower
price. In either case, however, the change of affairs does not provide abasis for a refusal to perform.
It is fundamental to contract law that the obligation created by a contract endures despite such
changing circumstances. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE LAW OF
REGRETTED DECISIONS 20-21 (1998) (defining regret as "the sensation of distress that you feel on
concluding that you have done something contrary to your present self-interest"). Contract law
allocates the risk of such market changes to each party, obligating each to perform (or pay damages)
despite market shifts. Indeed, the ability to lock in stated price is one of the prime motivations for
entering a contract. If a price change provided a basis for nonperformance, the reason for entering
contracts would be significantly diminished. Exceptions to this allocation are found in the doctrines
of mistake, impracticability (also called impossibility) and frustration. Only when a court finds the
state of affairs operates unfairly as analyzed under these doctrines will it excuse the regretful party
from its obligation to go forward with performance. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§§ 153, 261, 264 (1981).
[Vol. 52
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modification.7 On the other hand, if the facts establish that Seller used the
modification to achieve a better deal for himself' or used coercive tactics,
the defendant (Buyer) is likely to prevail. When facts clearly establish
either a legitimate reason for the modification or economic duress, the
judgment by the court is straightforward. Simply stated, easy cases are easy
to decide. When the facts present a balance on each side or the proof is
problematic, however,9 courts lack guidance from the Code on the method
for consistently distinguishing between justified (and enforceable)
modifications and those that are notjustified (and therefore unenforceable).
By contrast, the Restatement's corollary provision, section 89, gives useful
guidance for courts regarding the type of modification that should be
enforced. 0 The Code's test leaves open the question of who needs to prove
what and when. Does section 2-209 mean that the plaintiff must prove it
had a reason to seek a change? Must plaintiff prove that defendant acted
in bad faith when it accepted the proffered modification? Must defendant
prove that plaintiff lacked a reason to demand the change? Must defendant
prove that plaintiff acted without good faith? Must defendant prove that
plaintiff acted in bad faith? Does the absence of good faith mean plaintiff
is in bad faith? To justify a refusal to enforce, must defendant show
economic duress?
These problems of classifications and burdens t1 plague parties and
courts dealing with modification contests. As a result, courts sometimes
use good faith as a conclusory term to declare the winner of the suit. Courts
7. Coercion in this context could include economic coercion, such as may be present if a
seller waited to make the demand for modification until he knew Buyer could no longer find
substitute goods to meet other contract commitments.
8. Achieving a better deal after the contract has been formed is sometimes referred to as
"recapturing foregone benefits" because the party gains back an advantage given up in the contract.
A seller who enters a contract for steel beams at $150 a ton has foregone the benefit of receiving
$160 a ton for the goods. See Janine S. Hiller, Good Faith Lending, 26 AM. Bus. L.J. 783, 803
(1989) (noting that parties "should not attempt to regain benefits that have been willingly
foregone"); see also Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform
in GoodFaith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369,387 (1980); Thomas A. Diamond & Howard Foss, Proposed
StandardsforEvaluating When the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Has Been Violated:
A FrameworkforResolving the Mystery, 47 HASTiNGSLJ. 585,593 (1996); Recent Case, 77 HARV.
L. REv. 1142, 1146 (1964) (noting that "forgone benefits represent a cost to the subsidiary of
entering the agreement").
9. See Robert A. Hillman, Policing Contract Modifications underthe UCC: Good Faith and
the Doctrine of Economic Duress, 64 IOWA L. REV. 849, 900 (1979).
10. See infra Part IV. C.
11. Generally, the drafters of the UCC have been reluctant to speak to the procedural issue
of which party should bear the burden of proof on a particular issue. Although there are instances
of express allocations of the burden of proof in the Code, see U.C.C. § 2-607(4) (placing the burden
of proof on Buyer to establish a breach with respect to goods accepted), such expressions are the
exception rather than the rule under the Code.
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employ a wide range of tests and techniques for determining whether to
enforce a modification. Some require the plaintiff seeking enforcement to
make an affirmative showing that the modification was made in good
faith. 2 Others grant enforcement unless the defendant is able to establish
bad faith or coercion by the initiating party.13 This statement of the
standard (requiring that defendant bear the burden of establishing bad faith
by plaintiff) appears consistent with the general notion that the party
asserting a breach by the other (here a breach of the obligation of good
faith by the initiating party) bears the burden of showing that breach.'4 On
the other hand, a plaintiff (typically the initiating party in a modification)
should bear the burden of proof as the party seeking to change the status
quo. 5 Thus, application of the general principle that the party asserting a
breach should bear the burden fails to produce a clear rule in this context.
Moreover, the choice of a good faith or a bad faith standard is more than
a semantic distinction; it influences the focus of the court's inquiry and, in
close cases, may determine which party prevails. 6
Finding a test for reliably distinguishing between efficient
modifications and those that are opportunistic is the challenge of the
12. E.g., United States v. Progressive Enters., Inc., 418 F. Supp. 662, 663 (E.D. Va. 1976)
(recognizing good faith in a modification based on rising materials cost); Lumber Enter., Inc. v.
Hansen, 846 P.2d 1046, 1049-50 (Mont. 1993) (holding modification reasonable where
inexperienced seller, after performing for one year, determined that original contract price was
below production costs).
13. E.g., Erie County Water Auth. v. Hen-Gar Constr. Corp., 473 F. Supp 1310, 1313
(W.D.N.Y. 1979) (stating that extortion violated obligation of good faith); Ralston Purina Co. v.
McNabb, 381 F. Supp. 181, 187 (W.D. Tenn. 1974) (holding that a modification resulting in
compounding Seller's damages was not in good faith and unenforceable by purchaser who knows
or should know that Seller would not be able to complete contract); Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral
Corp., 272 N.E.2d 533, 536 (N.Y. 1971) (holding that agreement to increase price of equipment
unfairly coerced Buyer when Buyer could not obtain goods from other reliable source).
14. The view that defendant bears the burden of showing bad faith (or coercion) by the
initiating party finds broad support in the scholarship of this area. For example, Professor Robert
S. Summers argues that the concept of good faith is identifiable only by contrasting it with "specific
and variant forms of bad faith which judges decide to prohibit." Robert S. Summers, The General
Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELLL. REv. 810,820 (1982);
Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195,201-02 (1968) [hereinafter Good Faith] (asserting
that the concept of good faith "serves to exclude many heterogeneous forms of bad faith").
15. Here, each party asserts a breach: (1) Plaintiff asserts defendant breached the new
obligation of the modification, and (2) Defendant asserts plaintiff breached the obligation of good
faith applied under the original contract when he requested or demanded the change.
16. These differing approaches to applying section 2-209 seem to spring from differing
judgments regarding the utility of contract modifications and differing intuitions about the
significance of the problem of strategic or opportunistic demands for modification. They are
apparent in the dualistic view of modification found in the comments to the section. See infra Part
III. D.
[Vol. 52
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modification puzzle. Like many judgments in the law, the line of
enforceable modification may be "ever-shifting' ' 17 in response to business
norms and mores. It can be said with some confidence, however, that one
ought not seek to modify a contract unless there is some change of
circumstances or revelation that makes the original contract unfair or alters
the expectations of the parties-at least from the perspective of the
initiating party." The change of circumstances may result from increased
costs of performance (making performance more burdensome for
promisor) or from increased opportunity costs, as when a seller receives a
more profitable offer. Although reasonable minds can differ regarding what
constitutes good faith in a particular case, a process requiring initial
consideration of the basis for the request to modify seems likely to advance
the work of the courts, making their approach to this problem more
consistent and focused.
This Article explores the modification puzzle and the issues of erratic
justice that result from the nebulous nature of the UCC test. It evaluates an
alternative test, called here the sequential approach, that scrutinizes each
step of the modification process and imports the standard of reasonable
grounds into this context. Based on the Code's treatment of a related area,
assurance of due performance, the sequential approach supplants the vague
test of good faith with a requirement that the initiating party prove
reasonable grounds for the modification and scrutinizes both the initiating
and responsive stages of the modification in sequence. 19 Part II discusses
terminology and fundamental concepts in this area of law, including the
reasons for seeking a modification, the steps of a modification, and the
typical defenses to an action to enforce a modification. Part IEI of the
Article considers the social utility of contract modifications, exploring both
the vulnerability of contract parties to each other and the attributes of a
17. Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
18.
If a person is well informed and in secure enjoyment of his rights, then whatever
arrangements he chooses to make deserve to be honored. They represent a free
man's rational decision about how to dispose of what is his, how to bind
himself.... Honesty assures, first, that one will not mislead another as to the facts
in order to profit by the other's misinformed decision. It assures also that
engagements once made will be honored.
CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACTAS PROMISE: ATHEoRYoFCNTRACrUALOBUGATION 77-78 (1981).
19. The test could be characterized as a"shifting burden."The sequential approach described
here is similar to burden-shifting tests under other areas of law, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (holding that in non-class action suit under Title VII, the
complainant bears the initial burden of proving the prima facie case; the burden then shifts to the
respondent to show nondiscriminatory motive), with the additional attribute of attending to the
sequence of the conduct by the parties.
HeinOnline  -- 53 Fla. L. Rev. 55 2001
FlORIDA LAWRE/IEW[
utility-maximizing rule in this area. Part IV surveys the available standards
for judging modifications. It considers good faith and bad faith standards
and section 2-209(1) in its current form, parsing the text and comments of
the provision and exploring reasons for the provision's failure to achieve
a reliable rule. It also discusses the Restatement approach to the
modification problem and evaluates the benefits and possible limitations
of a "reasonable grounds" standard. Part V compares the traditional
approach of the Pre-existing Duty Rule with the current solution of section
2-209(1) and examines the changes in the provision recently proposed by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL). Part VI summarizes and analyzes decisional law. Part VII
formulates language for a sequential test of good faith modeled on the test
for assurances of performance under section 2-609. This Part considers the
reasons for using section 2-609 as a model for the modification provision
and assesses the sequential approach in light of typical defenses and
representative hypothetical cases. The conclusion urges the NCCUSL and
states to evaluate the sequential approach, considering whether it would
facilitate the work of the courts by providing a more consistent and
balanced test for enforcement of modified sales contracts.
II. FOUNDATIONAL CONCEPTS
A. Terminology
The modification problem arises when the parties change the contract
in a way that provides a new benefit to one party and a new detriment to
the other party. The Code applies the test of section 2-209 to both merchant
and non-merchant agreements. Typically, the modifying party is the
plaintiff seeking enforcement of the modification and the non-initiating
party is the defendant.20 Buyer is the obligor of the duty to pay and the
obligee of Seller's duty to sell. Seller is the obligor of the duty to sell and
the obligee of Buyer's duty to buy. In this Article, the modifying party is
called the "initiating party" because the party sought, or initiated, the
modification. As to the modified portion of the contract, the plaintiff is the
obligee of the changed promise. For example, the seller-plaintiff who has
20. In some cases, however, the non-initiating party seeks to enforce the agreement as
modified. E.g., IPEC, Inc. v. International Lithographing Corp., 869 F.2d 1080, 1084 (7th Cir.
1989) (granting damages based on finding modification reducing contract price resulted from
buyer's bad faith); T& S Brass &Bronze Works, Inc. v. Pie-Air, Inc., 790 F.2d 1098,1105-06 (4th
Cir. 1986) (enforcing modified contract in favor of buyer when seller initiated modification and
later failed to perform); Fratelli Gardino, S.P.A. v. Caribbean Lumber Co., 587 F.2d 204,206 (5th
Cir. 1979) (rejecting commercial impracticability as basis for contract rescission when Seller's sister
company could have delivered goods and calculating damages based on modified contract).
[Vol. 52
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secured a promise from Buyer to pay a higher price for goods than
originally agreed is the obligee of Buyer's promise to buy at the higher
price. In such a case, Buyer is the obligor of the modified promise to pay,
and also can be called the "non-initiating" party. If he refuses to act in
accordance with the modified contract, he is also a "recalcitrant." For
example, Buyer refuses to pay the increment after agreeing to the higher
price in a modification and the seller-obligee brings an action to enforce
the modified obligation to pay the higher price.2
B. The Steps of a Modification
The modification process involves two steps: (1) a party seeks a
modification, and (2) his contract partner agrees (or capitulates) to the
change sought. The non-initiating party has a right to refuse any requested
modification, demand performance under the original contract, and-in the
event promisor does not perform as promised-sue for damages.2" In such
a case, the rule on modification has no application because no modification
occurs. The non-initiating party can also remonstrate with the initiating
party, encouraging him to perform as promised. The feasibility of the non-
initiating party's choices depends on a variety of factors, including the
exigencies of future contracts, and (when he is the buyer in a contract) his
ability to cover.23
C. The Reasons for a Modification
Parties seek modifications for a variety of reasons-some justified and
others not.2" When the modification produces a change on each side and
each party benefits from the modification, it has the central attribute of an
original contract discussed above: the substance of the transaction is
inscrutable. It is difficult to judge because each party apparently receives
a bargained-for exchange. Like an original contract, enforcement should
be the default for such modifications unless the party resisting enforcement
can show that the other engaged in coercive conduct.
21. The reference to Seller as the initiating party is used as an example. See supra note 5 and
accompanying text.
22. E.g., Bolin Farms v. American Cotton Shippers Ass'n, 370 F. Supp. 1353, 1363 (W.D.
La. 1974); Bums v. Canal Constr. & Design Co., 470 N.E.2d 1362, 1366 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984)
(finding that a non-initiating party may refuse a modification of a construction contract and sue for
damages). A court may excuse the defendant's breach by nonperformance if defendant is able to
establish the elements of mistake or impossibility.
23. The right to sue does not resolve the problem, however, since parties bargain for more
than the right to win a lawsuit. See U.C.C. § 2-609 cmt. I.
24. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 30
(1995).
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Modifications that provide a unilateral change benefitting only one
party may arise from a variety of circumstances. The party seeking the
change may have encountered an unforeseen obstacle to performance or he
may seek a change simply to gain a benefit. As a theoretical matter one
might argue that modifications based on unforeseen benefits to the other
party should also merit recognition. Considering both obstacles and
benefits, from the Seller's point of view, two situations are likely: that
some obstacle to performance unknown at the time of contracting makes
the original contract unfairly burdensome to the Seller (category 1), or
some benefit of performance unknown at the time of contracting renders
the contract more (unfairly) favorable to the promisee (category 2). From
the Buyer's point of view, two corollary possibilities are present: some
obstacle to Buyer's performance (paying) unknown at the time of
contracting makes the original contract unfairly burdensome to the Buyer
(category 3), some benefit of performance unknown at the time of
contracting renders the contract more (unfairly) favorable to the Seller
(category 4).
Except under the doctrine of mistake, courts are reluctant to transfer
unforeseen benefits from one party in a contract to the other; the presence
of an unforeseen benefit does not provide a basis for excusing performance
or modifying a promise for either Buyer or Seller.2 Thus, categories (2)
and (4) are not often litigated. Additionally, cases of Buyer-sought
modifications may not be as common as Seller-initiated changes, 26 perhaps
because obstacles or difficulties of paying are pretty clearly allocable as
risks to the Buyer (category 3). Under this process of elimination, the
circumstance of Seller's obstacles or burdens (category 1) seems likely to
generate the greatest number of disputes.27 Additionally, a party may seek
to enforce a promise based on his reliance on that promise.28
25. See Erin Food Servs.,Inc. v. Derry Motel, Inc., 553 A.2d304,311 (N.H. 1988) (requiring
specific performance ofa real estate option where there was significant appreciation in value of land
between date of contract and trial court's order and transaction proved unexpectedly advantageous
to buyer).
26. Nevertheless, buyers sometimes seek enforcement of an agreement as modified. E.g.,
Sonfast Corp. v. York Int'l Corp., 875 F. Supp. 1099, 1102-03 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (enforcing a
modification which required Seller to waive rights to agreement and participate in rebid); June G.
Ashton Interiors v. Stark Carpet Corp., 491 N.E.2d 120, 124 (II. App. Ct. 1986) (holding that
Seller's failure to fulfill the terms of a modified agreement constituted a material breach); Jones v.
Abriani, 350 N.E.2d 635, 645 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (finding that Seller's express warranty
constituted modification of a contract and was binding under U.C.C. § 2-209(1)).
27. E.g., Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721,728 (Mo. Ct. App.
1979) (rejecting an unforeseen cost increase which made contract unprofitable for Seller as a basis
for a claim of commercial impracticability and granting specific performance in favor of Buyer).
28. See infra Part VII. D. 2-3. Such changes may be enforced even though not based on a
change of circumstances when they appear to present minor changes or when the initiating party
acted in reliance on the promise of the party who accepted the modification.
[VoL 52
HeinOnline  -- 53 Fla. L. Rev. 58 2001
REINVENTING THE DEAL
D. Typical Defenses to a Modification
Understanding the categories of defenses applicable to this area and
assessing how the defenses are affected by the standard for enforcement
provides a basis for judging the available standards for enforcement. The
following discussion categorizes typical defenses to modification
enforcement. Although the situations in which modification controversies
arise are varied, the defenses raised by the defendant (recalcitrant party)
generally fall into three distinct categories: (1) the defendant denies that the
parties agreed to a modification, 29 (2) the defendant asserts that plaintiff
lacked reasonable grounds for seeking the modification, 0 (3) the defendant
admits the modification but asserts it is the product of coercion.3' These
arguments may be raised singly or in conjunction.
1. Credibility Issues
In the first situation, the defendant (recalcitrant party) alleges that it
never assented to the modification. This situation presents a credibility
issue. The party attempting to enforce a modification may have a good
faith claim to an enhanced price or some other benefit sought by the
modification or he may "simply be a liar,"32 or chisler.33
A separate credibility issue relates to the credibility of promissor's
threat to breach. A threat by a seller to breach may lack credibility if the
costs of breach (including the expected damages and lost revenues) exceed
the net costs of performing. As a practical matter, assessment of this type
of credibility depends on the completeness and 'accuracy of the non-
initiating party's knowledge of the initiating party's costs. 34 Whether or not
a seller's threat is not credible in the abstract (actual costs of breach are
greater than costs of performing), buyer will also assess her need for the
goods and the likely consequences of breaches she may be forced to
commit as a result of her failure to obtain the goods, her ability to cover,
29. SeeTosco Corp. v. Oxygenated Mktg. &Trading A.G., No. 98C4695, 1999 WL328342,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 1999).
30. See Essen Nutrition v. Electronic Liquid Fillers, Inc., No. 95C5486, 1996 WL 535340,
*3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 1996).
31. See Erie County Water Auth. V. Hen-Gar Constr. Corp., 473 F. Supp. 1310, 1314
(W.D.N.Y. 1979); Essen Nutrition, 1996 WL 535340, at *4.
32. WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 24, at 34.
33. See Omri Ben-Shahar, The Tentative CaseAgainst Flexibility in Commercial Law, 66 U.
Cm. L. REV. 781, 803 (1999) (noting that the party who chisels after receiving goods "up front"
exploits the promisee's enforcement costs).
34. Asymmetries of information affect a party's decision-making in many areas. In the
increased price situation, asymmetries of information come into play when the non-initiating party
attempts to judge the credibility of a threat to breach.
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and the importance of the forward contracts to her (possible repeat
business, liquidated damages clauses, reputation etc.). Even if the non-
initiating party thinks the costs to the initiator should preclude his breach,
she may not be willing to take the risk by saying no-in which case the
bluff works.
2. The Defense of No Reasonable Ground
The reference to the requirement of good faith made by the Official
Comment to section 2-209 suggests that good faith is a necessary element
of an enforceable modification. Under the second defense, the defendant
alleges that the plaintiff lacked good faith (or a reasonable ground for
seeking the modification). For example, in the introductory hypothetical,
if Madison County agreed to the change, believing Steel Perfect's
representations about the increase in the price of iron (a component of
steel) and later learned that the price had not risen, a court should refuse
enforcement. 5
3. The Defense of Coercion
The issues of coerciveness and the reasonableness of the grounds for a
modification are closely linked. It is theoretically possible for a defendant
to raise the defense of coercion claim without asserting the defense that
plaintiff lacked reasonable grounds to modify. The force of this argument
is less powerful in this circumstance, however. If the coercion claimed
arises solely from circumstances outside the control of the plaintiff, the
defendant's claim is weakened.
II. THE UTILITY OF CONTRACT MODIFICATIONS
Just as parties are free to enter contracts of their own choosing, they are
free to modify contracts as they please. Nothing in the Code or contract law
prevents freely accepted changes. The option of modification works in
conjunction with the principles of efficient breach and legal excuse. If
expectancy damages operate to make the injured party whole, he will be
indifferent to a breach. Economists and contracts scholars agree that the
threat of breach has force only when expectation damages will fall short of
the promisee's actual damages caused by a breach.36
When changed circumstances disturb the equilibrium of the deal (by
presenting enhanced burdens or a possible efficient breach), parties are free
35. Other settings for this claim are surveyed in Part VII, on application of a sequential
approach.
36. E.g., Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Options: Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703, 746 (1996).
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to bargain around the change. Changes freely entered into presumably
reflect utility to each party, whether the asserted need for modification
arises from raised costs or raised opportunity cost. In a "raised costs"
situation, the seller or supply side learns that it will cost more to perform.
In the raised opportunity cost situation, Seller's performance itself does not
cost more but the seller has an opportunity cost that is higher. For example,
a seller who can handle only one job at a time is presented with a
significantly more profitable contract during the time period for which he
has agreed to perform under the original contract.37 In the raised
opportunity cost situation, the concept of efficient breach provides
protection for both contract parties. If a new opportunity allows the party
to make a profit in addition to paying transaction costs and damages to his
original (now aggrieved) partner, the substitute transaction presents an
efficient breach. Seller has a more profitable use of his time, and his offer
to modify can be seen as giving the non-initiating party the option of
seeking damages or deciding to pay a higher price to moderate the raised
opportunity costs to Seller. The circumstance can be dealt with by Buyer
paying more or by Seller buying his way out of the contract through
settlement. In the raised cost situation, by contrast, the party seeking to
modify is in a losing situation; no better deal presents itself on the horizon.
His costs are higher than believed at the time of contracting. Although the
doctrine of legal excuse may protect the seller from liability, it does not
save the net gain to society that the original contract presented. A
subsequent contract may or may not be formed in its place if this
transaction fails. If modification allows parties to save the contract by
absorbing the raised costs that would otherwise destroy the contract, there
is a net benefit in that the contract (as modified) goes forward.
From this perspective, there seems to be no persuasive reason for
policing modifications; suggesting that parties who enter a modification
should be bound by it. The modified contract may have utility for only one
party, however with the other agreeing because of coercion or duress."
The reinvented contract may be a "hold-up" deal.4
37. Because the raised opportunity cost scenario seems to present the weaker case for
modification, this Article focuses on the raised costs situation rather than the raised opportunity cost
situation.
38. Black's Law Dictionary defines coercion as "compulsion by physical force or threat of
physical force." BLACK'S LAW DiCTnONARY 252 (7th ed. 1999).
39. Black's Law Dictionary defines duress as "physical confinement of a person or the
detention of a contracting party's property," or "threat of confinement of detention, or other threat
of harm, used to compel a person to do something against his or her will or judgment." Id. at 520.
40. Angel v. Murray, 322 A.2d 630, 635 (R.I. 1974) (noting that the "primary purpose of the
preexisting duty rule is to prevent ... the 'hold-up game"').
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A. The Vulnerability of Contract Parties to Modification
The heart of the modification problem seems to lie in the vulnerability
of contracting parties to each other. Every party to a contract is vulnerable
to opportunistic demands for modifications by his contract partner.
Furthermore, every party is vulnerable to a hard-nosed refusal to modify
a contract despite a justifiable reason for modifying.41 The non-initiating
party has a right to insist on the original agreement and he can enforce the
agreement in court unless the initiating party convinces the court that his
performance should be excused under the doctrine of mistake or
impossibility.4 While such vulnerability is most noticeable in long-term
sales contracts or contracts for the sale of custom built, high-ticket items,
it is present in the basic relationship formed in each contract. The supply
side invests significant time and resources in developing and producing a
product for sale (in the case of a manufacturer) or in locating and obtaining
the goods (in the case of a broker). Likewise, the recipient of the goods
incurs reliance costs by rejecting deals with others and by incurring
preparation costs. Significant costs and time delays occur when the buyer
must try to revive earlier offers from rejected bidders.
One might suppose that the option of refusing to modify protects the
non-initiating party. If he needs the goods and does not wish to grant a
concession to the party initiating the modification, he should simply refuse
the modification request and demand performance as agreed under the
original contract. Such a response may not be a realistic choice, however.43
If the initiating party refuses to perform in response to the rejection of the
modification, the non-initiating party may find itself in breach on other
contracts. He has entered contracts for resale or plans to use the goods as
raw materials or component parts. Inability to obtain the goods from Seller
harms not only Buyer but also those subsequent purchasers of goods and
41. The principle that courts will not make contracts for the parties limits the protection given
to a party who is justified in seeking a modification. Courts will not force even a fair modification
on a party who refused to assent to the change. See Park-Lake Car Wash, Inc. v. Springer, 394
N.W.2d 505, 510 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that Plaintiff was entitled to enforcement on
agreement when it refused to assent to second modification); Solar Motors, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank,
545 N.W.2d 714, 721 (Neb. 1996) (finding that mutual assent was required to modify a contract,
which substantially changes the liabilities of the parties).
42. Courts will excuse performance of such a party under the doctrines of mistake and
impossibility. The doctrines of mistake and impossibility arguably serve to allow breach when it
is efficient. Enforcement of modifications to respond to situations of mistake or impossibility is
noncontroversial. Similarly, the law of modification seems to allow parties to go forward to
performance and, thus, avoid an inefficient breach.
43. E.g., Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 272 N.E.2d 533,536 (N.Y. 1971) (noting
that the recalcitrant party had no choice but to capitulate to demands for modification because of
contracts to provide products to the Navy on schedule).
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services further along in the stream of commerce. Likewise, the supply side
is vulnerable to demands that he provide more than the original contract
required or "settle" for a lower price.
B. A Utility-Maximizing Rule
Judicial enforcement of a modification differs from enforcement of an
original contract. In deciding whether to enforce an original contract courts
employ the validation device of consideration. This doctrine gives parties
wide latitude to enter bargains that are efficient from their own unique
perspectives, and a court need not deem a bargain fair to enforce it.
Additionally, the consideration doctrine prevents the enforcement of
contracts not bargained for despite the free assent of the parties. By
contrast, the good faith standard applied to modifications seems to call for
ajudgment by the court that the new agreement meets minimum standards
of fairness.44 The difference in treatment of these two situations is not
haphazard. It reflects a judgment that the situations differ in significant
ways.
Every law student knows that a peppercorn45 will serve as consideration
if a court determines that it was bargained for rather than being a sham46
or nominal consideration.47 The doctrine of consideration relieves courts
of the need to determine whether a transaction is "fair." Determining
fairness in the context of an original contract is burdensome, if not
impossible. The difficulty arises in large part because of the lack of a
baseline for judging the benefit or detriment of the deal;48 the burdens and
44. At first blush, the consideration for the original contract may seem sufficient as a
validation device for the modified contract. This justification may prove too broad, however, since
its logical extension is that all modifications should be enforced without regard to good faith.
45. See Williams v. Kansas Dep't of Soc. & Rehab. Serv., 899 P.2d 452,456 (Kan. 1995)
(upholding multi-million dollar trust established with "peppercorn" of ten dollars); Omaha Nat'l
Bank v. Goddard Realty, Inc., 316 N.W.2d 306, 310 (Neb. 1982) (noting sufficiency of
"peppercorn"); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441, 445 (N.Y. 1982) (recognizing
"proverbial peppercorn" as "adequate consideration"); Jackson v. Alexander, 3 Johns. 484, 493
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1808).
46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 cmt. b, illus. 5 (1981) (noting that
neither a "mere pretense of bargain" "merely nominal" consideration meets the test of bargained
for consideration).
47. The triumph of the bargain theory of contract law imported the use of the process of
bargaining for an exchange into formation analysis, rejecting the consideration doctrine as a
formalism to justify theuse of nominal consideration. See id. § 71; Demasse v. I'lTCorp., 984 P.2d
1138, 1145 (Ariz. 1999) (recognizing that consideration existed where employer and employee
made a"bargained forexchange); Schade v. Diethrich, 760 P.2d 1050,1057 (Ariz. 1988) (holding
that consideration exists where performance or a return promise is bargained for); Carlisle v. T &
R Excavating, Inc., 704 N.E.2d 39,43 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (finding that no contract existed where
consideration was not bargained for).
48. ProfessorTrebilcock has noted the difficulty of distinguishing between offers and threats.
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benefits are inscrutable, and contract law has advisedly chosen a standard
which presumes benefit when each party bargained for the deal. Thus, the
minimal standard of consideration relieves courts of the need to evaluate
the burdens and benefits of the deal to the parties."
The law of modification rejects such a hands-off approach, perhaps
because parties already bound together in a contract are especially
vulnerable to pressure from each other. A primary reason for entering a
contract is to lock in the price or performance offered.5° After parties enter
a contract, they stop the search for a contracting partner and prepare to
perform. Absent some constraint imposed by law, the hard (some would
say "unscrupulous") bargainer could enter an agreement and then seek
seriatim, modifications to achieve a more favorable deal or to reinstate
conditions rejected by the other in the original bargain."' Thus, greater
judicial oversight may be desirable in this context. Additionally, courts can
make more confident judgments about the fairness of a modification
because the original contract provides the baseline forjudging benefits and
burdens. It is relatively easy to see whether the modification has a clear
winner and a clear loser, at least when the modification involves a single
change.52 On the other hand, when each party receives a sought-for change,
the situation presents inscrutability on a level comparable to that of
original contracts. In such cases, as with original contracts, the free
bargaining principle seems to require enforcement.53
MICHAELJ. TREBILCOCK,THE LIMS OFFREEDOMOFCONTRACr 80 (1997) (citing CHARLES FRIED,
CONTRACrAS PROMISE: ATHEORYOFCONTRACTUALOBLIGATION 92-111 (1981)). He explains this
difficulty by taking an example from Fried. See id. A pianist who has given free recitals for a church
states that he will require a fee for recitals in the future. See id. Is the status quo (baseline) free
recitals or is this a new offer to give something (a recital for a fee)? See id.
49. The presumption is that parties who enter into a voluntary private exchange are each
better off because of the exchange or they would not have entered it. See Whitney v. Steams, 16
Me. 394, 397 (1839) (noting the sufficiency of a peppercorn to satisfy consideration doctrine).
50. See David V. Snyder, The Law of Contract and the Concept of Change: Public and
Private Attempts to Regulate Modification, Waiver, and Estoppel, 1999 WiS. L. REV. 607.
51. If modifications are judged by too lenient a standard, parties will not be able to rely on
an agreement or to plan with confidence future business transactions.
52. This is not to say that complexity never arises in modifications. Some modifications
involve a change that is arguably beneficial to both parties such as when both performance and
price are changed. This situation takes on characteristics of the original contracting process and
reinserts the difficulty of determining fairness.
53. Other factors may lessen the likelihood of opportunistic conduct on the part of the
initiating party. For example, the opportunity for repeat contracting between the parties encourages
good faith in modifications. Likewise, because the sharing of information within a trade group
enhances the importance of the reputation of a trader, opportunistic modifications are less likely in
such settings. Finally, the Code provides some protection for the non-initiating party against unfair
demands for modification. Conversely, in cases where parties are unlikely to contract again, the
incidence of opportunistic conduct may be heightened. See infra Part VII. B. It is likely that a party
presented with a request or demand for modification has reasonable grounds to demand assurances
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Obstacles to performance do not, in and of themselves change contract
obligations. That a contract is more difficult to perform than anticipated
does not justify a refusal to perform; nor does it create a right to modify.
Rather, such obstacles to performance raise the difficult qualitative
question of whether the nature and extent of the obstacle or additional
burden provide a basis for a court to excuse performance. The doctrines of
mistake and impossibility deal with such issues effectively, 4 excusing
performance only when the burden is sufficiently significant." This is not
to say that the fixed-price contract can never be modified but rather that the
reason for seeking a modification should be a primary concern of the court
in determining whether a modification is a reasonable request or a "hold-
up game.' 5
6
of performance from the other party. See U.C.C. § 2-609.
54. The doctrine of mistake deals with an unallocated risk, which creates a problem that
neither party knew of at the time of contracting. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§
152-154 (1981). Impossibility, further divided into impracticability and frustration, deals with the
problem of obstacles that arise after contracting. See id. at §§ 261,265,266; see also Northern Ind.
Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 275 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that
doctrines of frustration or impractibility are not applicable where contract specifically assigns a
particular risk to contracting party); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 517
F. Supp. 440,446 (E.D. Va. 1981) (refusing to recognize defenses of impossibility, impractibility,
frustration or mutual mistake where contractor assumed risk of difficulty of performance);
Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53,59 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (recognizing the
doctrines of impracticability and frustration where Seller's nonlabor production costs rose beyond
foreseeable limits and reforming agreement between parties); Sunflower Elec. Coop., Inc. v.
Tomlinson Oil Co., 638 P.2d 963,971 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (denying relief under the impmctibility
of performance doctrine where the risk was foreseeable to seller and circumstances of contract
indicated seller assumed risk).
55. A rich and detailed body of law relating to the classification of obstacles deemed
sufficient to excuse performance inhabits the doctrine of impossibility. See Steven L. Schooner,
Impossibility of Performance in Public Contracts: An EconomicAnalysis, 16 PuB. CONT. L.J. 229,
265 (1986) (asserting that courts should consider which party is primary risk bearer to determine
whether performance failure should be excused in public contracts); Gerhard Wagner, In Defense
of the Impossibility Defense, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 55, 63-89 (1995) (discussing the impossibility
doctrinein light of current economic theory); Susan E. Wuorinen, Case Comment, Northern Indiana
Public Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Company: RiskAssumption in the Claims of Impossibility,
Impracticability, and Frustration of Purpose, 50 OmIO ST. L.J. 163, 177-78 (1989) (arguing that
courts should consider the totality of the circumstances at contract formation in determining
whether performance failure should be excused). Code provisions on mistake, impossibility, and
the right of assurances present a template for weighing the performing party's need for change
against the needs of the recipient. Thus, while these doctrines place a burden on the party seeking
to change the baseline of the contract, they provide significant judicial leeway. They assess "the
ever-shifting line, drawn by courts hopefully responsive to commercial practices and mores, at
which the community's interest in having contracts enforced according to their terms is outweighed
by the commercial senselessness of requiring performance." Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United
States, 363 F.2d 312, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
56. Angel v. Murray, 322 A.2d 630,635 (R.I. 1974) (recognizing that a preexisting duty rule
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A standard that makes modifications too difficult creates a brake on the
economy, making parties reluctant to enter future contracts for fear they
will be held to performance in changed circumstances. Likewise, a rule
that allows frivolous or opportunistic modification is a disincentive to
trade. A standard that allows easy modifications (unsupported by a reason
for the change) undermines the certainty of contracts and erodes
confidence in contracting.57 Certainty is a relative concept, 8 however,
describing a principle that is not always desirable. Indeed some contract
principles deliberately embrace a standard of uncertainty to encourage
continuity and stability, pushing the parties toward working out their
problems rather than abandoning the contractual relationship they have
entered. 9
When an unallocated contingency occurs, the appropriate starting point
in the analysis of modification is the contract itself.' It defines the rights
of the parties. This fact suggests that the initiating party should not be
allowed to enhance his position under the contract absent an affirmative
showing of reasonable grounds or detrimental reliance.6' The party who
unilaterally declares the contract at an end or seeks to excuse his
seeks "to prevent... the 'hold-up game'); see also Jason Scott Johnston, DefaultRules/Mandatory
Principles: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Good Faith and the Contract Modification Problem, 3
S. CAL INTERDISCIPLINARY U.J. 335, 342-50 (1993) (explaining the "hold-up" game and noting
incentives to pay when remedy for breach is not fully compensatory); Barry J. Kusinitz, Damages
in Construction Litigation, 38-May R.I. B.j. 13, 25-6 (1990) (pointing to Alaska Packers Assoc.
v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902), as a classic example of the hold-up game and noting
examples of such behavior in the construction industry).
57. The modifying party would argue for a more lenient standard than impracticability,
pointing to the assent of the contract partner as a reason for enforcing a modification. While this
argument has appeal, a lenient standard may encourage parties to contract without sufficiently
investigating the possibility of a change in the market price of the good or in the cost of raw
materials needed to manufacture the good.
A contractual regime must maintain the integrity of bargains, and this means not
reversing the allocation of risks on which the parties evaluated their bargain when
they made them. Bargains are struck and their prices evaluated on the assumption
that they will be kept. If they are not kept, the injured party may claim expectation
damages.
FRIED, supra note 18, at 117.
58. Complete certainty is never attainable in the contracts context in the sense ofensuring that
parties go through with the deal as originally agreed. After all, the power of rescission always lies
within the joint decision-making of the parties. In the face of a stringent rule regarding what
constitutes an enforceable modification, parties may retreat from the contract via rescission.
59. See infra Part IV.
60. In contracting, parties may allocate risks of contingencies occurring. Likewise, they may
designate the types of changes in circumstances that justify a modification to their contract. By
doing so, parties produce a further allocation of the risks under the contract.
61. See WiHrE & SUMMERS, supra note 24, at 35.
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performance based on mistake or impracticability is changing the baseline
of the status quo agreed to by the parties. Accordingly, he bears the burden
of persuading the court that his claim of excuse is justified. Likewise, a
party who seeks a modification is changing the baseline of the contract,
and, absent mitigating circumstances, should bear the initial burden of
establishing a need for the change.
62
One way to assess the influence of a modification rule is to hypothesize
the extreme cases. Assume, for example, that modifications are enforceable
without regard to the good faith or reasonable grounds for requesting the
modification. In such a system, there would be little reason to enter
contracts other than those for immediate performance. The existence of a
contract would merely indicate that parties have agreed to go forward
together with likely future changes to the arrangement. Such a scheme fails
to provide security for contracting parties or to encourage advance
planning by businesses and individuals. Conversely, a system which allows
no modifications also discourages contracting by failing to allow changes
in response to changing needs and circumstances. Thus, courts need a
standard that strikes a balance, minimizing the likelihood of opportunistic
modification but allowing efficient modifications.
IV. STANDARDS FOR JUDGING MODIFICATIONS
The variety of approaches employed by courts, legislative bodies, and
scholars in judging modifications is evidence of the difficulty of finding a
satisfactory test for assessing the interests present in the modification
problem.
A. The Good Faith Standard
Professor Farnsworth noted that the term "good faith" has a "faintly
pious ring to it" 63 that may seem out of place in commercial law.Z
Nevertheless, good faith has long been recognized by courts as a
requirement in commercial transactions, binding parties not only to the
express terms of an agreement but also to those "naturally implied" in the
agreement.65 Clearly a wide range of opinion exists regarding what
62. White and Summers apply the label of "extortionist" to the party who requires additional
payment without justifiable cause. See id.
63. Farnsworth, supra note 4, at 669.
64. See ide (identifying good faith with terms such as "faith," "morals," and "honor" may
seem "curious" in describing commercial conduct).
65. F.H. LAWSON, A COMMON LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CIVIL LAW 124-25 (1955); see also
Amoco Oil Co. v. Ervin, 908 P.2d 493,498 (Colo. 1995) (noting widespread use of the good faith
performance doctrine to effectuate intentions of parties); Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118
N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917) (recognizing an implied duty to use reasonable efforts); Hayden v.
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constitutes good faith. For example, Professor Charles Fried reasons that
the duty of good faith requires a "forthcoming attitude."66 Professor Robert
S. Summers argues persuasively that good faith can best be understood in
terms of the conduct it excludes.67 Professor Robert Jerry notes the "near
tautological qualities of any definition of good faith."68 Professor Ian Ayres
reasons that contract parties have the power to alter the expectations or
defaults of contract law, adding detail to what comprises good faith in their
agreement.
69
1. The Code's Use of Good Faith
The general requirement of good faith for transactions governed by the
UCC is set forth in section 1-203: "Every contract or duty within this Act
imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."70
Good faith can be regarded as a larger set than consideration because it can
embrace gratuitous promises as well as ones supported by consideration.
It also comprises a smaller set than consideration because contracts for
which consideration exists may fall short of the good faith requirement if
Hoadley, 111 A. 343,345 (Vt. 1920) (implying a duty to complete work in reasonable time when
a contract lacked completion date).
66. "The concept of good faith is regularly invoked not only to condemn deception and lack
of candor at the time a bargain is concluded, but also to require a forthcoming attitude, to condemn
chicanery and sharp practice in the carrying out of contractual obligations." FRIED, supra note 18,
at 85. Similarly, Professor Gillette notes that"[m]any scholars advocate an expansive interpretation
of good faith." Clayton P. Gillette, Limitations on the Obligation of Good Faith, 1981 DUKE L.J.
619,619.
67. See Summers, supra note 14.
68. Robert H. Jerry, II, The Wrong Side of The Mountain: A Comment on Bad Faith's
Unnatural History, 72 TEx. L. REV. 1317, 1336, 1343 (1994) (suggesting that treating insurer bad
faith "as a contract breach and invoking contract remedies would give insurers more certainty about
outcomes ... (and] reduce system-wide costs"). Professor Clayton Gillette argues that the
obligation of good faith that inheres in every contract does not impose a duty to be a commercial
good Samaritan or to rescue one's contract partner from economic peril when the obligor did not
create the peril and had no duty under the contract to assume a risk of the peril. See Gillette, supra
note 66, at 656; see also Susan D. Gresham, "Bad Faith Breach": A New and Growing Concern
for Financial Institutions, 42 VAND. L. REv. 891, 913-16 (1989); Eileen A. Scallen, Sailing the
Uncharted Seas of Bad Faith: Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 69 MINN.
L.REv. 1161, 1165-76 (1985); Kevin M. Teeven, Development of Reform of the Preexisting Duty
Rule and Its Persistent Survival, 47 ALA. L. REV. 387, 441-53 (1996).
69. See Ian Ayres, & Stewart Schwab, Economic Analysis of State Employment Law Issues
Symposium, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 71, 85 (1999) (noting unenforceability of clause "Seller
waives duty of good faith performance").
70. U.C.C. § 1-203; Conoco Inc. v. Inman Oil Co., 774 F.2d 895, 909 (8th Cir. 1985)
(defining good faith to mean parties must "do nothing destructive" of other party's right to enjoy
fruits of contract and must do "everything the contract presupposes it will do to accomplish the
contractual purpose and finding Conoco breached obligation of good faith by underpricing
competiton").
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the transaction does not meet minimum standards of fairness.7 The term
"good faith" carries a variety of meanings within the Code. The drafters
refer to good faith approximately fifty times72 within the 400 provisions of
the Code.
In imposing a standard of good faith under the Code, section 1-203
differentiates between the formation of the contract and the enforcement
or performance of the contract. While good faith inheres in the
enforcement and performance stages of contract, the Code imposes no
good faith obligation in contract formation,7 3 leaving the policing of
formation to equity concepts74 and doctrines imported from tort law. 75
The meaning of good faith is also influenced by the status of the party
evaluated, further complicating the inquiry under section 2-209.76 The
Code includes a general definition of "good faith" as "honesty in fact in the
conduct or transaction concerned. 77 This threshold standard of section 1-
201(19) requires subjective good faith in every Code transaction. Article
2 also includes a definition relating specifically to merchants. Good faith
in the case of a merchant under Article 2 means "honesty in fact and the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the
trade."' This definition adds the objective requirement of "reasonable
commercial standards" to judge the conduct of merchants. Thus, the
standard applicable to merchants combines subjective and objective
elements. It requires that the merchant establish that his conduct was both
71. See U.C.C. § 2-209, cmt. 1 (rejecting consideration as a substitute for good faith); see
also Permanent Ed. Board Commentary 10, reprinted in SELECTED COMMERCIAL STATUTES 790,
792 (West 2000).
72. See Farnsworth, supra note 4, at 667. Because of the numerous references, Farnsworth
calls good faith "the darling of draftsman." Id.
73. Although the comments to U.C.C. § 2-209 leave unclear the choice of a standard, the
choice of good faith seems to dispel the argument that the standard is inapplicable to the
modification process. The courts that have dealt with the requirement have applied the good faith
requirement to modification cases. See Northern Fabrication Co. v. Unocal, 980 P.2d 958, 962
(Alaska 1999) (noting the court's desire to preserve good faith agreements); Hendlin v. Fairmount
Constr. Co., 72 A.2d 541,556 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1950) (recognizing common law rule of
good-faith contract modification); Enserch Corp. v. Rebich, 925 S.W.2d 75, 83 (Tex. CL App.
1996) (noting that consideration is not required for good-faith modification).
74. Courts may refuse to enforce a contract specifically based on equity concepts. E.g.
Harper, Drake & Assoc., Inc. v. Jewett & Sherman Co., 182 N.W.2d 551,561-62 (Mich. CL App.
1970) (holding agreement void for lack of consideration).
75. For example, a contract based on fraud or misrepresentation is voidable. E.g.
Germantown Mfg. v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138, 141 (Pa. 1985) (noting that contract was voidable
on showing of fraudulent or material misrepresentation).
76. The approach suggested in this Article simplifies the inquiry of good faith while
maintaining the distinction between transactions involving a consumer or consumers and those
involving two merchants. See infra Part VI.
77. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1998).
78. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b).
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honest and consistent with "reasonable commercial standards." '79 The Code
defines merchant as follows:
Merchant means a person who deals in goods of the kind or
otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having
knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved
in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be
attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other
intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as
having such knowledge or skillO
Applying these standards to the introductory hypothetical case
illustrates the variation in the meaning of good faith. Steel Perfect (Seller)
appears to fit the definition of "merchant" under the Code; it "deals in
goods of the kind" (i.e., steel in this transaction) and also apparently "holds
[itself] out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods
involved in the transaction." 1 Thus, Steel Perfect's conduct in the
modification process is subject to the requirement applicable to merchants,
that is "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing in the trade." 2 The Buyer, Madison County, may
or may not fall within the Code's definition of "merchant." Probably the
County does not hold itself out as having special expertise in steel, but it
may hold itself out "as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices"
of contracting for public improvements such as bridges.83 Additionally, it
79. Id. Additionally, a third standard of "good faith and within limits set by commercial
reasonableness" inheres in some settings. Farnsworth, supra note 4, at 676.
80. U.C.C. § 2-104.
81. Id.
82. Id. § 2-103(1)(b).
83. Comment 2 to U.C.C. § 2-104 provides support for holding Madison County is a
"merchant" for purposes of the modification contest. It provides:
The special provisions as to merchants appear only in this Article and they are of
three kinds. Sections 2-201(2), 2-205,2-207 and 2-209 dealing with the statute of
frauds, firm offers, confirmatory memoranda and modification rest on normal
business practices which are or ought to be typical of and familiar to any person
in business. For purposes of these sections almost every person in business would,
therefore, be deemed to be a "merchant" under the language "who... by his
occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the
practices. . . involved in the transaction.. ." since the practices involved in the
transaction are non-specialized business practices such as answering mail. In this
type of provision, banks or even universities, for example, well may be
"merchants." But even these sections only apply to a merchant in his mercantile
capacity; a lawyer or bank president buying fishing tackle for his own use is not
a merchant.
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may have contracted through "an agent or broker or other intermediary
who by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or
skill." 84 If the County held itself out as having such special knowledge or
hired such an intermediary, it will also be held to the higher standard of
both "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing in the trade.8 5 If the County did not act through
an intermediary and did not hold itself out as having expertise, it would be
held to the more subjective (and more lenient) standard of "honesty in fact
in the conduct or transaction concerned. 86
Just as background expectations cannot be fully articulated at the outset
of any transaction, 7 the concept of good faith cannot be exhaustively
defined without context.8 8 It is, of necessity, somewhat amorphous.
Nevertheless, it may have greater precision and determinateness within a
specific context.89 In specific settings, courts can discern content in the
"protean concept ' '" of good faith and determine a baseline or minimum for
comporting with the requirement in a well-defined issue.91 Indeed, the
parties may add specific content to the meaning of good faith used in their
contract.92 In the area of settlements, for example, the fact of assent is
insufficient to enforce a settlement. The party seeking enforcement must
show that he held a good faith belief in the claim he surrendered, not
simply that the parties bargained for that surrender. The good faith required
to support a settlement is generally based on a test requiring honesty and
reasonableness.93 Enforcing settlements without such a showing of good
Id. § 2-104 cmt. 2.
84. Id. § 2-104.
85. Id. § 2-103(l)(b).
86. Id. § 1-201(19).
87. FRIED, supra note 18, at 87.
88. See Good Faith, supra note 14, at 215. ("If an obligation of good faith is to do its job,
it must be open-ended rather than sealed off in a definition.").
89. See Permanent Ed. Board Commentary 10, supra note 71, at 792; Christina L. Kunz,
Frontispiece on Good Faith: A FunctionalApproach Within the UCC, 16 WM. MITCHELL L.REV.
1105, 1117 (1990) (urging drafters revising UCC to "re-examine the 'grab-bag' use of good faith"
and adopt instead a functional analysis to make it "easier to ascertain" within the context of
particular sections).
90. Farnsworth, supra note 4, at 668.
91. See Kunz, supra note 89, at 1110-14.
92. See Ian Ayres, Empire orResidue: Competing Visions ofthe Contractual Canon, 26 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 897, 901-02 (1999) (noting that "many prophylactic rules that are initially
characterized as mandatory often can be modified to give even more protection to one of the
contracting parties. For example, the mandatory duty of good faith can be contracted around to
enhance a promisor's fiduciary duties.").
93. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.12, at 72-73 (2d. ed. 1990) (noting that
courts generally require both an honest belief and a doubtful claim, i.e., one that has some substance
in fact). Although Restatement Second seems, by its literal language, to endorse enforcement based
on good faith alone, see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 74(1) (1981), many courts
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faith would establish a system of "anything goes" so long as the party
seeking enforcement obtained the assent of the obligor. In such a system,
nuisance lawsuits would provide the basis for an enforceable settlement.
In the area of modification the irreducible minimum of good faith
should be that the initiating party has a legitimate reason for seeking the
modification. Whatever drives trading partners-egoism, zero sum
wagering, or cooperative risk sharinga--the obligations set by the original
contract provide the baseline of expectations." Thus, the analysis of
whether to enforce the modification should begin with the reason for the
change. A test of reasonable grounds, like that used in the settlement
context, would provide a scenario that stops short of a "free card" or
"anything goes" for the initiating party. While such a standard would not
provide iron-clad insurance against opportunism, it would, provide a
platform for judicial scrutiny of the transaction and reduce the likelihood
of opportunistic conduct without unduly restricting modifications.9 6
2. Good Faith in Section 2-209
Comment 2 to section 2-209 speaks of the good faith requirement in
general terms, creating the impression that the good faith of both parties is
required for an effective modification. Further consideration of the issue
suggests, however, that only the initiating party's good faith should be
considered in the modification context. It makes no sense for a court to
refuse to enforce a modification on the ground that the defendant
(capitulating party) lacked good faith and never intended to live up to the
modification. 7 When the initiating party meets the requirements noted, the
capitulating party's lack of good faith should not constitute a defense for
enforcement. Taking the introductory hypothetical as an illustration,
assume that the parties agreed to Steel Perfect's requested modification
based on a significant price change, that the risk of such a change was
unallocated by the contract, and that Steel Perfect used no coercive tactics.
Assume further that Madison County never intended to pay the increased
price. This lack of good faith by Madison County should not constitute a
defense to the claim for enforcement by Steel Perfect when Steel Perfect
meets the requirements noted above.98 Making the capitulating party's
good faith an element of the claim benefits the party in the wrong, giving
require the showing of reasonableness of the plaintiff's belief as well. See FARNSWORTH, supra, §
2.12, at 72-74.
94. See Gillette, supra note 66, at 651.
95. See Fried, supra note 18, at 17-21.
96. Limiting modifications to cases in which the excuse of impossibility or mistake is
established is too restrictive.
97. See THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 5-8.
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that party a "free card" to renounce the modification at will. 99 The
capitulating party's intention to perform, vel non, should be irrelevant to
the inquiry of enforcement under section 2-209. Moreover, an investigation
of the party's subjective intent is at cross purposes with the accepted
standard of objective manifestation of intent.m
°°
The requirement of good faith springs from the obligations formed by
the contract; it does not encompass an element necessary for enforcement.
Good faith is applicable to both parties once they modify the contract just
as the requirement of good faith inheres in every contract once the parties
create it. Thus, a party seeking to enforce a contract need not establish the
good faith of the parties in the formation of the contract. Likewise, in a
modification, the capitulating party's obligation of good faith should be
seen as a mandate rather than a test for enforceability. The initiating party's
good faith, on the other hand, goes to the heart of the issue whether
circumstances justified the modification sought by the initiating party.
B. The Competing Standard of Bad Faith
The comments to section 2-209(1) also refer to the standard of bad
faith, that evil twin often lurking in the shadows of good faith issues. The
concept of bad faith has garnered its share of commentary and judicial
notice.1 Courts deciding modification cases sometimes focus on whether
the modification was the result of bad faith by the modifying party.' °2 In
the Wisconsin Knife case, for example, Judge Posner noted that the UCC
drafters "took a fresh approach" to the issue of modification "by making
modifications enforceable even if not supported by consideration.., and
looking to the doctrines of duress and bad faith for the main protection
99. It is not surprising that courts have not rejected modifications on this basis.
100. See Laserage Tech. Corp. v. Laserage Lab., Inc., 972 F.2d 799, 802 (7th Cir. 1992)
(holding that assent is determined by "reference to what parties expressed to each other in their
writings, not by their actual mental processes"); Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 522 (Va. 1954)
(noting that a party's "undisclosed intention is immaterial except when an unreasonable meaning
which he attaches to his manifestations is known to the other party").
101. E.g., Linda Curtis, Damage Measurements for Bad Faith Breach of Contract: An
Economic Analysis, 39 STAN. L. REV. 161, 163-72 (1986); Gresham, supra note 68, at 913-16;
Jerry, supra note 68, at 1318-37; Eileen A. Scallen, Sailing the Uncharted Seas of Bad Faith:
Seaman's Direct Buying Sere., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 69 MINN. L. REv. 1161, 1165-76 (1985).
102. See Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1288 (7th Cir.
1986) (holding that an attempted oral modification of contract operated as waiver of written
modification requirement only if there was a showing of reliance, and absent a showing of reliance,
judgment in favor of seller could not stand); Oskey Gasoline & Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 534
F.2d 1286, 1288 (8th Cir. 1976); Pirrone v. Monarch Wire Co., 497 F.2d 25, 29 (5th Cir. 1974);
United States ex rel. Crane C. v. Progressive Enters., Inc., 418 F. Supp 662, 664 (E.D. Va. 1976)
(holding that modification was enforceable when request for modification was justified by Seller's
increased cost and that Buyer engaged in bad faith conduct when refusing to pay adjusted price).
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against exploitive or opportunistic attempts at modification. "' When facts
establish duress or coercion, courts refuse enforcement under section 2-
209.104 The distinction between the good faith and bad faith standards often
seems to be a matter of allocating the burden of proof.
C. The Restatement Approach to Modification
The Restatement sets forth its analysis of the modification problem in
section 89, which provides:
A promise modifying a duty under a contract not fully
performed on either side is binding (a) if the modification is
fair and equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by
the parties when the contract was made; or (b) to the extent
provided by statute; or (c) to the extent that justice requires
enforcement in view of material change of position in reliance
on the promise.
10 5
In comparison with section 2-209, the Restatement approach provides
more guidance for courts. It endorses enforcement of a modification that
is "fair and equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the
parties when the contract was made."'1 6 This approach to modification is
more helpful than that of the UCC approach in two distinct ways. First, the
standard focuses on the modification itself rather than on the contract as
modified, drawing attention to the event of significance. Additionally, the
standard fleshes out the meaning of fair and equitable by noting the context
relates to "circumstances not anticipated by the parties."' This statement
of the standard focuses the court on evaluating the ground for a
103. Wisconsin Knife Works, 781 F.2d at 1285-86.
104. The refusal to enforce a coercive modification is noncontroversial and, for that matter,
available without resort to section 2-209. In other words, coercion and duress provide an
independent basis for refusing to enforce a contract. Contract law has developed policing doctrines
that invalidate obligations assumed as a result of duress or coercion. See Norton v. Michigan State
Highway Dept., 24 N.W.2d 132 (Mich. 1946) (defining duress and coercion); Mancino v.
Friedman, 429 N.E.2d 1181 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980) (finding economic duress sufficient to void
contract); Crane, 1999 WL 701393 *4 (distinguishing duress and coercion; defining duress as a
"threat that arouses such fear as to preclude a party from exercising free will and judgment;
coercion as that which "implies compulsion or restraint"); Rush v. Derrick, 1999 WL 111782 *8
(Tex. App.) (unpublished opinion) (defining duress as "'threat to do some act which the threatening
party has no legal right to do"' (quoting Tenneco Oil Co. v. Gulsby Eng'g Inc., 809 S.W.2d 599,
604 (Tex. 14 D.C.A. 1993)) involving "open coercion," and noting that "duress" "destroy[s] the
free agency of the party to whom it is directed; causes imminent restraint; and that the person to
whom it is directed has no present means of protection").
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modification. The comment to the section notes that the requirement of the
section "goes beyond absence of coercion and requires an objectively
demonstrable reason for seeking a modification." '
The scope of the section is limited to a "contract not fully performed on
either side."' 9 The Restatement does not explain the reason for this
limitation."' The official comments to section 89 of the Restatement do
not analyze or mention the limitation. This limitation may indicate a view
that a dispute regarding a contract fully performed on one side presents a
setting for settlement rather than modification. Or it may acknowledge the
greater vulnerability of a party who has fully performed compared with one
who owes an executory duty. A party who has performed can no longer
modify his performance. Accordingly, he lacks leverage in negotiations to
change a contract. For example, assume that a party has paid in advance
$10,000 for another to excavate a basement. Upon hitting rock, the
excavation company seeks an increase in the price. If the Buyer of services
has already paid the $10,000, he is worse off than if he has paid nothing.
If he chooses not to go forward with the modification, he will need to seek
return of the payment in addition to finding a substitute deal. In such a
case, Seller can exploit all of the usual pressures on Buyer (the difficulty
of opening negotiations again with other sellers, the exigencies of needing
the goods) and, additionally, the leverage that Buyer no longer has the
payment price to offer others and that Buyer's money (as well as the
goods) is held up. Similarly, the seller who has fully performed before
receiving payment may be more vulnerable to Buyer's demands to do a bit
more since Buyer is holding on to the money and Seller has invested
reliance costs in performing. He may capitulate rather than resist Buyer in
this situation.
108. Id. at § 89, cmt. b.
109. Id.§ 89.
110. The UCC makes no mention of such a limit in scope in the sale of goods context.
Professor Teeven argues that the limitation allowing modification only of contracts not fully
performed on one side may not serve the logic of the Code:
If section 89 is going to permit a modification of a partially executed contract,
then why not permit a modification when it has been fully performed on one side
or the other?... The possibility of extortion should no longer be a concern once
the performance is completed, but it is a factor to consider when the partial
performer refuses to proceed unless he is paid more. If a modification is freely
consented to after a party has fully per formed, why not enforce it if the promisor
finds a benefit or consents to recompense because of the unforeseen difficulties
it will overcome?
Kevin M. Teeven, Development of Reform of the Preexisting Duty Rule and Its Persistent Survival,
47 ALA. L. REV. 387, 431-32 (1996).
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In the case of Angel v. Murray,"' the Rhode Island Supreme Court
enforced a modification of a contract between the City of Newport and a
company under contract to haul the city's waste, finding that a
modification is justified without consideration (or nominal consideration)
when changed circumstances make the modified contract fair and
equitable."2 It required that the circumstances "which prompted the
modification were unanticipated by the parties, and the modification is fair
and equitable,"' . and noted that the scope of modification is limited to
executory contracts." 4
D. The Reasonable Ground Standard
Some courts refuse enforcement of modifications absent a showing that
the plaintiff had a justifiable cause (here referred to as "reasonable
ground") for seeking the change. The standard of reasonable grounds
presents a more specific inquiry than the generalized standard of "good
faith." Although the term "reasonable grounds" is, itself, a relative term,
subject to variation based on the circumstances presented in individual
cases, the Code imposes this requirement in the area of assurances of
performance." 5
Whether substitution of this test of "reasonable grounds" in place of
"good faith" advances the analysis of this area is, of course, open to debate.
Contract law does not require reasonable grounds for contract formation
or for a decision by the parties to rescind the contract. But it does require
that the party have "reasonable grounds" to seek assurances from the other
that he will perform as promised. In the case of contract formation or
termination by rescission, joint action is required. Together the parties
change the baseline of their relationship. When a party is dissatisfied with
the contractual arrangement and wishes to make a change, he can urge the
other party to rescind and form a new contract or rescind and end the
relationship. The distinction ofjoint action versus unilateral action may not
111. 322 A.2d 630 (R.I. 1974).
112. The Angel case is a precursor to the Restatement Second treatment of modification. The
Angel court cited comment (b) to section 89 of Restatement Second in tentative draft form. 322
A.2d at 637 n.3.
113. Id. at 637.
114. The Angel case involved a contract entered by the City of Newport and Alfred Angel, a
refuse hauler. Id. at 631. When the city grew at an unanticipated rate, Angel sought a modification
to the contract to pay him additional compensation of $10,000 per year. See id. The trial court
refused enforcement of the modified contract on the basis that Angel had not fulfilled the process
for approval by the city, and additionally, because the plaintiff had a pre-existing duty under the
original contract to haul all of the waste generated by both old and new homes. See id. The
reviewing court reversed on the ground that the changes in compensation were justified because the
"extra collection resulted from actions completely beyond [plaintiff's] control." Id. at 638.
115. SeeU.C.C. § 2-609 (1998).
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tell the full story, however. As a practical matter, someone goes first in
exploring any change, including exploring the possibility of entering a
contract, dissolving a contract, or entering a modification. Every formation
or rescission begins when one of the parties initiates it-a unilateral act.
Nevertheless, in the cases of contract formation or rescission the
significant step is taken by the parties jointly. The policies of freedom
underlying the free bargain theory of contracting accept this joint decision,
and the doctrine of consideration dispenses with detailed inquiry into the
benefits and burdens of the decision-when the parties have bargained for
that change.
This analysis also applies to modifications when there is some
beneficial change on each side. In such circumstances, it seems to make
sense to treat modification like formation and rescission. In cases where
there is a new benefit to only one party, however, the context presents a
situation closer to that of the assurance of performance area. When a
modification presents a unilateral benefit to one party, it parallels the
context of a demand for assurances. In response to an obstacle to
performance or some dissatisfaction, one party takes a unilateral action to
attempt to regain equilibrium (or an opportunistic party seeks to gain some
advantage). In the assurances context, the Code looks squarely at the
question of the basis for the first volley in the sequence: the ground upon
which an individual sought assurances. Like the assurances area, scrutiny
of the reason for a demand to modify limits the power of a party to engage
in a hold-up game.
Any rule devised to balance the rights of the parties in this area should
be constructed with careful knowledge that too stringent a doctrine may
push parties to rescind their contract and re-contract to avoid the doctrine.
This move, which could be referred to as the "rescission-reformation"
trick, reduced the power of the pre-existing duty rule.116 Thus, construing
reasonable grounds too narrowly creates new problems accompanying an
overly-rigorous test. For example, a reasonable grounds standard that
accepts only a situation justifying excuse of performance may not give
sufficient leeway for modification.'17 The reasonable grounds test need not
116. The pre-existing duty rule has no effect on a change when the parties rescind the original
contract and enter a new contract to achieve a change. Because the parties have rescinded the
contract containing the orignal duty, no existing duty is changed by the second contract. See
Hillman, supra note 4, at 685 (noting that "mutual rescission" theory is "perhaps the most
frequently invoked exception to the preexisting-duty rule") (citing Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch,
Inc., 131 N.E. 887, 889 (N.Y. 1921)).
117. Excuse of performance is based on the doctrines of mistake, impracticability (also called
impossibility) or frustration.'Traditional doctrine distinguishes two kinds of surprises: mistake, and
frustration or impossibility. Mistake relates to a false assumption about how things are at the time
of contracting; frustration and impossibility relate to incorrect assumptions about how things will
be later, when it comes time to perform." FRIED, supra note 18, at 58; supra note 44.
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be so restrictive. It is satisfied by ajudicial consideration of the grounds for
the change to provide a way of separating the unfair demands to alter a
contract from reasonable requests for a change.
E. Voluntariness as a Standard for Judging Modifications
Another way of addressing the good faith required for an enforceable
modification is by focusing on the voluntariness, vel non, of the party who
assents to the modification. 18 The controlling assumption is that one who
freely assents to a requested modification should be held to it. This
approach has difficulties of its own, of course. Voluntariness is a relative
concept. Even assuming a clear case of a justified modification, the
capitulating party's assent may be involuntary in a sense. The party
agreeing to pay a higher price for goods certainly does not like the change
that now requires the higher payment. Moreover, the defendant resisting
enforcement can be depended upon to assert that his assent was not
voluntary. Courts rightly refuse to determine such questions of mental
disposition by the declarations of the parties to a controversy. Just as issues
of intent should not be determined by "a tour of Walters' cranium, with
Walters as the guide,"119 the issue of the voluntariness of a modification
rightly requires stronger proof than the assertions of an interested party.
F. The Effects of the Nebulous Test
Absent the protections of a reliable test separating reasonable from
opportunistic modifications, the existence of a contract does little more
than set the stage for a series of additional negotiations during the time
period between contracting and performance. Modifications that allow the
initiating party to gain new advantages undermine the certainty of
contracts.1 20 Allowing modifications without sufficient justification
destabilizes the expectations of contracting parties and diminishes the
efficiency of contracting. On the other hand, certainty is a relative concept.
Modem contract law has rejected the formalistic stance of Williston and
the early tradition of formalism, which favored certainty over flexibility.
Moreover, complete certainty is never attainable in the sense of ensuring
118. See Angel v. Murray, 322 A.2d 630,634 (R.I. 1974); Watkins & Son v. Carrig, 21 A.2d
591, 594 (N.H. 1941) (enforcing a modification and noting that defendant "intentionally and
voluntarily yielded to a demand" for a higher price after plaintiff encountered rock in its excavation
of a cellar for defendant).
119. Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 F.2d 810, 814-15 (7th Cir. 1987).
120. The benefits of certainty can be overstated. Certainty is a relative concept and one that
does not always enhance efficient contracting. See supra Part I1. The Utility of Contract
Modification.
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that parties go through with the deal as originally agreed. 12' Indeed,
certainty is not always a good thing in contract law. In some settings,
contract law fosters uncertainty. For example, under the doctrine of
material breach, a party to a contract is not free to cancel the contract with
impunity. Unless the other party has materially breached the contract, the
decision to declare a contract terminated is "fraught with peril."'2 This fact
leads to great uncertainty for a person considering whether to terminate the
contract. The decision whether a material breach has occurred involves
balancing several factors to assess the positions and conduct of each
party." The canceling party should also know that the court's
judgment-rather than his own-controls the decision of whether the
termination is itself a material breach. 4 The intentionally nebulous
standard of material breach is desirable because it encourages the parties
to resolve their differences and go forward with the contract, maintaining
their contractual relationship.
In the context of modification, by contrast, uncertainty destabilizes
contracting by increasing the likelihood of demands for modification. A
party who knows that considerable uncertainty surrounds the issue of
whether the initiating or capitulating party bears the burden of proof at trial
may be emboldened to demand changes. If he can wrest an agreement from
the other, the modifying party may prevail simply because of a dearth of
proof from the defendant. In a contest involving a nebulous rule, every fact
is significant and the role of advocacy is enhanced. This fact enhances, in
turn, the likelihood of unsystematic and haphazard results and greater
temptations to demand modifications.
V. THE CURRENT UCC SOLUTION TO THE MODIFICATION PROBLEM
In 1952, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (NCCUSL) and the American Law Institute (ALL) approved the
Uniform Commercial Code. As the states adopted the Code thereafter,
section 2-209 changed the common law relating to modification of sales
contracts by dispensing with the requirement of consideration. Now
enacted in virtually all U.S. jurisdictions, the provision allows parties to
121. The power of rescission always lies within thejoint decision-making of the parties. In the
face of a stringent rule regarding what constitutes an enforceable modification, parties may retreat
from the contract via rescission.
122. Walker & Co. v. Harrison, 81 N.W.2d 352,355 (Mich. 1957).
123. These include the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit he
expects under the contract, the ability to adequately compensate the injured party, the likelihood
of forfeiture by the party failing to perform, the likelihood of cure by the party failing to perform,
and good faith and fair dealing. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 241 (1981).
124. See id. §§ 241-242. If the termination constitutes a material breach, it may justify a claim
for damages and the discharge of the injured party's duty to perform.
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create an enforceable modified agreement without establishing
consideration for the change of obligation."n
A. The Change From the Common Law
Traditional common law looked to whether the original contract had
been rescinded or modified on both sides, requiring the party seeking
enforcement to satisfy the doctrine of consideration as a way of protecting
the non-initiating party from coercion. 26 The common law recognized that
the potential for coercion is present in the modification context.127 Having
entered a contract, the parties have ceased negotiations with others and
their ability to make a substitute arrangement may be severely curtailed. In
business slang, the non-initiating party may be "over a barrel,"'28 or the
initiating party may be chisleing or playing a "hold-up game."'129 At
common law, a party could defeat enforcement of a modification unless the
plaintiff established that the modification was supported by consideration.
The doctrine establishing this power, the Pre-Existing Duty Rule,
continues to operate at common law in some jurisdictions, but it appears
to be of decreased importance generally. 30 Although the sweeping
125. A Westlaw search conducted on Sept. 7,1999 found forty-nine states have adopted some
form of section 2-209, dispensing with the requirement of considerationin the modification of sales
contracts. Louisiana has not adopted section 2-209, but Louisianacase law supports dispensing with
consideration in the contract modification context. See Pennzoil Co. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm.,
789 F.2d 1128, 1144 (5th Cir. 1986) (referring to U.C.C.§ 2-209 in recognizing that modification
may occur when buyer complies with seller's request for price increase); Snedegar v. Noel Estate,
438 So. 2d 677,679 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that contracts may be modified by mutual consent
of the parties).
126. See Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99, 102 (9th Cir. 1902) (holding a
contract modification unenforceable absent revocation and new agreement or additional
consideration).
127. The difficulty of determining whether particular conduct amounts to coercion is a
separate, difficult topic. Professor Trebilcock asserts that the "prior determination" of rights
necessary to determine whether a move is coercive "takes issues of coercion outside the domain of
contract law." TREBILCOCK, supra note 48, at 80-8 1.
128. "[W]hen a businessman is poorly educated, 'over a barrel,' or the victim of fine print, a
court may invalidate a clause that would otherwise stand up between ordinary business persons."
WHrrE & SUMNMRS, supra note 24, at 157; see also Oldenburger v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 765
P.2d 531, 534 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (finding no contract repudiation in plaintiffs statement that
she was "over a barrel"); Gooch v. Am. Sling Co., 902 S.W.2d 181, 187 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995)
(holding a claim of being "over a barrel" failed to demonstrate duress sufficient to void contract).
129. See Angel v. Murray, 322 A.2d 630, 635 (R.I. 1974).
130. See Gregory E. Maggs, Ipse Dixit: The Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the
Modern Development ofContractLaw, 66 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 508,513 (1998) (reviewing twenty-
one cases that relied on section 89 and predicting that "most courts will follow" the section). At
common law, parties can create an enforceable modified contract by revoking their original
agreement and entering a new (modifying) agreement. But see Teeven, supra note 110, at 387
(noting the "400-year survival of the much-criticized ... rule").
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principle imposed by the Pre-Existing Duty Rule may go too far in the
direction of protecting against extortion,' a rule requiring the party
opposing enforcement to show coercion may swing the test too far in the
other direction.
3 2
B. The Goals of the UCC
The Code seeks to attain both flexibility and stability in the rules
governing contracts for the sale of goods. 33 In situations in which the
parties agree that a modification is justified, no countervailing social issue
requires stability or maintenance of the original contract. Thus, no tension
exists between the goals of stability and flexibility in freely entered
modifications. But tension between flexibility and stability is present in
disputes that go to court with the parties disagreeing about whether the
modification was the product of free will. When a party resists
131. See Charles L. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of
Promissory Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 52,72 (1981) (noting "glaring flaws" of the Pre-existing
Duty Rule, including "abuse that can be practiced by one who apparently assents to the
modification of an existing contract, knowing that he can repudiate it with impunity").
132. See Hillman, supra note 9, at 849-50 (stating that "[d]espite the restrictiveness of the pre-
existing duty rule," it "did provide to contracting parties some protection from unfair demands to alter
contract terms already freely agreed upon"); WILLIAM D. HAwLAND, -AwKLAND UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2-209:03 (1999) (noting "elimination of the need for consideration
to make a binding agreement to modify... also eliminated a safeguard that existed at common law
against fraudulent or mistaken allegations that the parties had agreed to changes in the original
contract"); Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGALSTUD. 411,
422 (1977).
133. See Robert A. Hillman, A Study of Uniform Commercial Code Methodology: Contract
Modification Under Article Two, 59 N.C. L. REV. 335, 336 (1981). Professor Hillman's point is
undoubtedly correct although the Code does not include flexibility or stability in its list of goals to
be attained. The Code lists its general purposes in section 1-102:
(1) This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying
purposes and policies.
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom,
usage and agreement of the parties;
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
(3) The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement, except as
otherwise provided in this Act and except that the obligations of good faith,
diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed
by agreement but the parties may by agreement determine the standards by which
the performance of such obligations is to be measured if such standards are not
manifestly unreasonable.
U.C.C. § 1-102 (1998).
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enforcement, his position in court is that he did not freely assent to the
modification.
C. The Standard of Section 2-209
The drafters of the Code used broad standards as a way of incorporating
flexibility to the Code.'3' The good faith standard is an example of such
intentional flexibility.1 35 By imposing a requirement of good faith, the
drafters of the Code supplanted the validation device of consideration in
the modification context, 13 6 allowing courts to consider fairness in this
setting. 37 Although the text of the provision makes no mention of good
faith, 3 ' the requirement appears in the official comment to the provision.
Thus, when a party enters a modification as a result of economic duress or
coercion, 139 a court should refuse to enforce the modification."0 Often the
evidence regarding the modification will not present a clear picture,
however. In such cases, the meaning of good faith employed by a court is
likely to be determinative. Professor Hillman pointed out the failure of the
Uniform Commercial Code to provide protection from unfair demands to
alter contract terms.1 41 Noting that the approaches to modification
formulated by both the Code and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
134. See Hillman, supra note 9, at 851.
135. Id.; Good Faith, supra note 14, at 215. ("If an obligation of good faith is to do its job,
it must be open-ended rather than sealed off in a definition.").
136. U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 1.
137. "[Tihe occasions and pressures forcontract changes are numerous and diverse. A contract
modifier may be motivated by changed circumstances, unforeseen circumstances, or mere change
of mind. And not all contract modifiers are honest. Extortionists, chiselers, and whiners also come
to feed at § 2-209."
138. The comment also notes that "good faith" as applied to merchants includes an objective
standard. U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 1. The test of "good faith" between merchants or as against
merchants includes "observances of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade."
Id. § 2-103.
139. See Rich & Whillock, Inc. v. Ashton Dev., Inc., 204 Cal. Rptr. 86,90-91 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984) (enforcing an original agreement on grounds that the settlement agreement and release were
products of economic duress).
140. See Hillman, supra note 9, at 849-50 (stating that "[d]espite the restrictiveness of the pre-
existing duty rule ... the rule did provide to contracting parties some protection from unfair
demands to alter contract terms already freely agreed upon").
141. Id. at 850. In his 1979 article, Professor Hillman noted that conflicting paradigms pointed
to the failure of the Uniform Commercial Code to "provide to contracting parties some protection
from unfair demands to alter contract terms already freely agreed upon." Id. The proposed revision
to section 2-209(1) addresses this problem by expressly incorporating a good faith standard as a
requirement of an effective modification. Professor Hillman also delineated the difficulty of
determining which of the good faith standards under the Code applies in this setting, and of
assessing modifications under either of the standards. Id.
(Vol. 52
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"have been off the mark,' 42 he criticized section 2-209(1) for failing to
offer guidance in determining which modifications should be enforced and
concluded that "the Code's approach has not been very successful in
supporting voluntary modifications or in precluding coerced ones."'43
Commentators have offered a variety of approaches for defining an inquiry
that would separate worthy and enforceable modifications from
undesirable and unenforceable modifications. For example, Professor
Hillman suggested that a modification "that produces a material net loss on
the contract to the promisor... should be presumed to be the result of
coercion." 1"
D. The Dichotomy of Approaches and Mixed Messages
of Section 2-209
The experience of over four decades suggests that the lack of precision
of a generalized good faith standard deprives section 2-209 of force and
tends toward an undependable application of its principles. Indeed, the
generalized nature of the provision is not the only problem. The confusion
of this area springs in large part from the mixed messages and dual tests of
the comments to this section. The potential for confusion in the language
of the comments can best be seen through a line-by-line analysis of
Comments 1 and 2 to section 2-209. To facilitate analysis of the language,
each sentence of Comments (1) and (2) is indented.
Comment 1: This section seeks to protect and make
effective all necessary and desirable modifications of sales
contracts without regard to the technicalities which at present
hamper such adjustments.
145
Comment 1 limits the protection and endorsement of the provision to
"all necessary and desirable modifications," providing some content to the
concept of good faith in this context.46 The comment expressly rejects "the
142. Hillman, supra note 4, at 686. Professor Newell called the provision a "mess," and
declared its drafting "perhaps the worst in Article 2." Douglas K. Newell, Cleaning up U.C.C.
Section 2-209, 27 IDAHO L. RE V. 487, 487 (1990-91). Professors Goetz and Scott noted that the
Code test of §2-209(1) is "substantially more difficult to enforce" than the Pre-existing Duty Rule
and "may not deter extortionate renegotiation as effectively." Charles J. Goetz & Robert G. Scott,
The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 67 VA. L. REv.
967, 1024 (1983).
143. Hillman, supra note 4, at 686.
144. Hillman, supra note 9, at 884.
145. U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 1.
146. Id.
2001]
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technicalities which at present hamper such adjustments," an apparent
reference to the Pre-existing Duty Rule.47
Comment 2, sentence 1: Subsection (1) provides that an
agreement modifying a sales contract needs no consideration
to be binding.'48
The first sentence of Comment 2 simply restates the provision's effect
of dispensing with the doctrine of consideration for purposes of
modification, emphasizing the drafters' rejection of the Pre-existing Duty
Rule.
Comment 2, sentence 2: However, modifications made
thereunder must meet the test of good faith imposed by this
Act.1
49
The second sentence of Comment 2 provides the clearest focus on the
good faith requirement, stating that modifications "must meet the test of
good faith., 150 This sentence seems to set the applicable test. Its form is
mandatory, suggesting that the plaintiff seeking enforcement of a
modification bears the burden of establishing good faith. The reference
seems to identify good faith as a non-negotiable element of the test. Indeed,
it appears to point to good faith as the full test of the enforceability of a
modification.
Comment 2, sentence 3: The effective use of bad faith to
escape performance on the original contract terms is barred,
and the extortion of a "modification" without legitimate
commercial reason is ineffective as a violation of the duty of
good faith.'
51
The third sentence of Comment 2 states the converse and creates
redundancy. It states an example that clearly does not meet the standard
noted in the previous sentence: A modification motivated by bad faith is
not enforceable. It should go without saying that, if the test is good faith,
then it is not met by a showing of bad faith. The comment states that
"extortion of a 'modification' without legitimate commercial reason is
ineffective."' 52 By discussing an extreme, this statement inserts confusion
147. Id.
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regarding who must carry the burden of proof under section 2-209(1). Are
the drafters championing the obvious, or setting a burden on the shoulders
of the defendant who opposes enforcement of the modification? Some
courts have read this sentence as a paradigm for enforcement, putting
defendants in the position of producing evidence of an initiating party's
bad faith." 3
Comment 2, sentence 4: Nor can a mere technical
consideration support a modification made in bad faith.'
Sentence 4 rejects "mere technical consideration" to support abad faith
modification, emphasizing the Code's total rejection of consideration as a
validation device in the modification context.'55 The rejection operates on
two levels. Consideration is neither necessary nor sufficient to support a
modification. In other words, plaintiff need not show consideration, and
the fact that the plaintiff establishes technical consideration is irrelevant.
Consideration is thus rejected as a substitute for the good faith standard.
Without this point, an opportunistic party could urge enforcement of a bad
faith modification based on the doctrine of consideration. Nevertheless, the
comment's reference to "bad faith" further muddies the water, encouraging
courts to require that defendants establish bad faith to defeat enforcement
of a modification.
Comment 2, sentence 5: The test of "good faith" between
merchants or as against merchants includes "observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade"
(section 2-103), and may in some situations require an
objectively demonstrable reason for seeking a modification.'56
Sentence 5 to Comment 2 deals with merchants. Consistent with
section 2-103, the sentence notes that merchants are held to the objective
standard of the "observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in the trade." '157 But the Comment's statement that the court "may
in some situations require an objectively demonstrable reason for seeking
153. Wisconsin Knife Works v. Nat'l Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280 (7th Cir. 1986)
(announcing need for showing of bad faith to defeat modification); Jamestown Farmers Elevator
v. General Mills, Inc., 522 F.2d 1285 (8th Cir. 1977) (requiring economic duress to overcome
modification); Agroindustrias Vezel v. H.P. Schmid, 1994 WL 12342 (holding that claim of
economic duress hinges on showing of a wrongful act "sufficiently coercive to cause a reasonably
prudent person faced with no reasonable alternative to succumb to the perpetrator's pressure").
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a modification,"' 58 adds confusion, suggesting that such an "objectively
demonstrable reason" is sometimes-but not always-necessary. This
comment sets up a standard for enforcement, and, in the same breath,
denies it force, leaving unclear whether plaintiff must produce evidence of
a legitimate reason for the modification. The comment gives no guidance
regarding when courts should require a reason for the modification.
Comment 2, sentence 6: But such matters as a market shift
which makes performance come to involve a loss may
provide such a reason even though there is no such unforeseen
difficulty as would make out a legal excuse from performance
under sections 2-615 and 2-616.'
Sentence 6 continues the trend toward confusing dualism. It draws out
the analysis to the point at which clear guidance seems just around the
comer, but stops short of an explanation. The sentence indicates that a
market shift in the cost of performance that does not present a legal excuse
may provide a basis for enforcement."6 While this sentence makes clear
that the set of enforceable modifications includes promises given in
circumstances that would not justify the modifying party in withholding
performance, it fails to set any parameters on the concept, leaving courts
to wonder if "anything goes." Does every market shift justify a demand for
a modification? If so, is there any reason to enter a fixed price contract? If
not, in what circumstance might a market shift fall short of a reason for
modifying?
It may be that the drafters intended to define a situation in which the
initiating party ultimately fails to establish the legal excuse of
impracticability although he had a good faith belief that he could rightly
withhold performance. Like the law of settlement, this interpretation gives
leeway to the initiating party without setting up an "anything goes"
system. 16' To assume that the comment endorses enforcement for the
158. Id. (emphasis added).
159. Id.
160. Here, the drafters use the phrase "market shift" to refer to a market shift in input prices,
constituting raised cost to the seller. A market shift may, by contrast, relate to the price of the goods
contracted for. Such a shift creates an increased opportunity cost of performing-a circumstance
less likely to justify modification.
161. A focus on the good faith belief of the plaintiff achieves the kind of balance endorsed in
the settlement area by case law and § 74 of Restatement (Second) of Contracts. In addition to
showing that the defendant settler assented to the agreement, the party seeking to enforce a
settlement must show that he held a good faith belief at the time of the settlement that this claim was
well-founded. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Voland, 653 A.2d 484,488 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1995); United Cal. Bank v. E. Mountain Sports, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 945, 962 (Mass. 1982).
Similarly, section 76 of Restatement (Second) of Contracts focuses on good faith in a context in
which a claim is doubtful. See Fiege v. Boehm, 123 A.2d 316, 321-22 (Md. 1956). Without this
[Vol. 52
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initiating party who knows he has no right to withhold performance allows
the clear risk of enforcement although the initiating party acted to recapture
benefits foregone in the original contract.
The comments to section 2-209 present a mixed message. The
confusion engendered by the dual approaches is particularly troubling
because it leaves open the question of choice of an enforcement paradigm.
Thus, the stage is set for indeterminacy in litigated cases and in the
marketplace.
E. NCCUSL's Provision
As part of its revision of Article 2-the first comprehensive
reevaluation of the Article'since the 1950s' 6 2-- the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) and the ALI proposed
a change that expressly incorporated the obligation of good faith into the
text of section 2-209.13 The text of the proposal states: "An agreement
made in good faith modifying a contract under this article needs no
consideration to be binding."' ' A newly formed committee is now
beginning again the task of revising Article 2, including this proposal.'65
It could be argued that, rather than effecting a real change, the revised
provision merely made the good faith requirement more conspicuous by
moving it from commentary to text." Nevertheless, by clarifying its
purpose, the revision improved the provision significantly. Moreover, since
states do not ordinarily adopt the Code's official comments, moving the
requirement to text defeats the possible argument that good faith is not
mandated by this provision. Although the change proposed would improve
the provision dramatically, it falls short of the goal of a reliable rule. The
proposed change perpetuates the confusion of the original text regarding
which party bears the burden of establishing good faith or the absence of
good faith. The history of the Code, the variety of approaches found in
decisional precedent, and judicial ambivalence toward modification are
likely to perpetuate the current confusion in this area of law. Against this
backdrop, the comments to the proposed revision fail to clarify the test.
The only comment to section 2-209 relevant to modified agreements is a
check of good faith, pure nuisance settlements and modifications made without legitimate reason
would be enforceable.
162. See Amelia H. Boss & Jean Braucher, Significant Changes in the Proposed Revisions of
Article 2 on Sales, SB29 ALI-ABA 143, 145 (1996).
163. See William C. Smith, Selling ContractRevisions, Again, 85 A.B.A.J. 26,26 (Dec. 1999).
164. U.C.C. § 2-209 (proposed NCCUSL draft, Mar. 1, 1999).
165. See Smith, supra note 163, at 26.
166. The Reporter's Comments note that the intent of the current revision of the Code is to
clarify the law and address the need for internal harmony among the provisions of the Code. U.C.C.
§ 2-209 (proposed NCCUSL draft, Mar. 1, 1999).
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reference to the Roth Steel case. 67 This case is an example of economic
coercion. It is a clear cut case that provides no guidance to courts trying to
decide which party has the burden of going forward in less than clear-cut
circumstances. Thus, confusion regarding modified contracts is likely to
persist in the market and in the courts, and intractable problems of
predicting the enforceability of modifications will continue even if the
change is eventually adopted.
VI. REPRESENTATIVE CASES
A review of the cases that have arisen in the modification context
demonstrates the wide variety of judicial approaches to the issue of
modification. Some courts focus on free assent as the core of the
modification inquiry. Others look for a justifiable reason for the
modification or consider whether a change in market conditions was
foreseeable. Still others focus on the availability of reasonable alternatives
to the defendant or apply a waiver theory.
68
A. Cases Enforcing an Agreement as Modified
While courts often invoke a good faith standard in applying section 2-
209,169 they have failed to find a common thread for what constitutes good
faith in this context. 7' In Angel v. Murray,7' the Rhode Island Supreme
Court approved (the then proposed) section 89 of Restatement (Second) of
Contracts and delineated the test for modification, requiring that
circumstances "which prompted the modification were unanticipated by
the parties, and the modification is fair and equitable."' 72 The court noted
that the rule applied to a modification made "during the course of
performance of a contract;' 73 that is, before the contract modified was
167. Roth Steel Prods. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 705 F.2d 134, 148 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding a
contract modification ineffective due to seller's failure to establish he acted honestly).
168. See Mott Equity Elevator v. Svihovec, 236 N.W.2d 900, 908 (N.D. 1975).
169. E.g., Pirrone v. Monarch Wine Co., 497 F.2d 25,29 n.5 (5th Cir. 1974) (referencing GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 109A-1-103 and 109A-2-209, which apply good faith test); Allapattah Servs., Inc.
v. Exxon Corp., 61 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1316-17 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (noting that modifications must
meet test of good faith); Palmer v. Safe Auto Sales, Inc., 452 N.Y.S.2d 995, 996 (Civ. Ct. 1982)
(recognizing that modification must be made in good faith).
170. E.g., T & S Brass & Bronze Works v. Pic-Air, Inc., 790 F.2d 1098, 1105 (4th Cir. 1985)
(applying a good faith requirement from a standard of "legitimate commercial reason"); Gardino
v. Caribbean Lumber Co., 687 F.2d 204,209 (5th Cir. 1979) (suggesting that evidence establishing
bad faith demonstrates lack of good faith); Erie County Water Auth. v. Hen-Gar Constr. Corp., 473
F. Supp. 1310, 1313 (W.D.N.Y. 1979) (finding that extortion violated good faith obligation).
171. 322 A.2d 630 (R.I. 1974).
172. Id. at 636-37.
173. Id. at 636.
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fully performed on either side. 74 In cases of executory contracts, rescission
is an open possibility while some performance remains to be accomplished
on each side of the deal.'75 If a contract is fully executed on one side, courts
are likely to treat the dispute as one for settlement rather than one for
modification, 176 or they may refuse to enforce the modification, viewing it
as a "hold-up game.: 
77
Other courts determine whether changed circumstances existed at the
time of the modification and whether such circumstances justified a change
in the contract. In Agroindustrias Vezel v. H.P. Schmid, Inc.,17 1 the court
held that the modification of a supplier of sesame seed did not amount to
bad faith or a wrongful act of the type required under the economic duress
doctrine. There, the supplier contracted with the defendant for the sale of
seed at a price of $28.50 per 100 pounds. Before shipping, the supplier
contacted the defendant and requested that the contract be modified to
increase the price to $29.50 per 100 pounds, basing the change on the fact
that floods had destroyed forty percent of the sesame seed crop. The
defendant agreed to the price increase "under protest."' 79 After rumors that
the supplier was not fulfilling other contracts, the defendant withheld part
of its payment and demanded assurances of performance. The supplier
refused the defendant's demands and sued for the modified contract price.
The court focused on the issue of bad faith, rejecting the defendant's claim
of bad faith and reasoning that the supplier's "request for a less than four
percent price increase in the wake of severe crop damage from natural
forces was not bad faith."' 80
Similarly, courts focus on the concept of economic duress. In
Jamestown Farmers Elevator, Inc. v. General Mills, Inc.,'81 a seller of
grain brought an action to recover the difference between the market price
at the time of delivery and the contract price claiming it was compelled to
deliver under the contract because the buyer, a large corporation,
threatened to put the seller out of business and to institute criminal or
regulatory proceedings. The court found the seller had failed to establish
duress, stating that to establish business compulsion requires "more than
174. See id. (quoting proposed revision of § 89 of Restatement (Second) of Contracts).
175. See id.
176. Section 89 of Restatement (Second) of Contracts excludes contracts fully performed on
one side from the scope of the rule on modification.
177. When a party has fully performed its promise under a contract, the other party has more
leverage to make demands regarding the performance it has yet to render.
178. No. 92-15078, 1994 WL 12342 (9th Cir. Jan. 18, 1994).
179. Id. at *2.
180. Id. at *3; see also Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. United States, 656 F.2d 650,653 (U.S. Ct.
CI. 1981) (finding that mere economic pressure to modify a contract is not duress sufficient to
invalidate a modification when plaintiff had reasonable alternatives to agreeing to the modification).
181. 552 F.2d 1285 (8th Cir. 1977); supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
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a mere threat which might possibly result in injury."'18 2 The court listed
three requirements necessary to establish a claim of economic duress: (1)
that the party asserting duress involuntarily accepted the terms, (2) under
circumstances that permitted no alternative, and (3) those circumstances
were the result of wrongful coercive acts on the part of the modifying
party.
183
Some courts focus on the failure of the recalcitrant party to protest the
requested modification. In United States ex rel. Crane Co. v. Progressive
Enterprises, Inc.,84 the court upheld a modification which increased the
price of the goods, finding that the defendant-purchaser had acted in bad
faith. The parties entered a contract for the sale and purchase of a machine
which the defendant intended to resell to the United States. After the
defendant accepted plaintiff s price of approximately $5,000, the plaintiff-
Seller notified the defendant that the price of the machine had risen to
$7,000. Without protest, defendant submitted a purchase order at the
revised price. After delivery, defendant paid the original price and resisted
demands for the increase on the basis that the changed price was
ineffective. The court found the increased cost of the machinejustified and
held that the defendant (recalcitrant party) had acted in bad faith by failing
to communicate its objection to the plaintiff.
B. Cases Refusing to Enforce a Modified Agreement
A decision that the party seeking to enforce a modification acted in bad
faith provides a basis for refusing to enforce the modification. In Roth Steel
Products v. Sharon Steel Corp.,"8 5 the court refused to enforce a
modification because it found that the seller failed the test of honesty in
fact. The seller sought to modify a contract to sell steel by raising its prices.
Despite its finding that the seller's ultimate loss on the contract, as
modified, demonstrated that the modification was commercially
reasonable, the court regarded the seller's threat to sell no more steel to the
buyer as evidence of bad faith and refused enforcement. The detail of
evidence produced may have provided the lynchpin for this decision.
Defendant was able to establish statements by Plaintiff indicating that it
would not perform under the contract originally agreed to. While a threat
of non-performance may be implicit in a modification request, making the
threat of non-performance explicit is likely to give the non-initiating party
182. Jamestown Farmers, 552 F.2d at 1290.
183. Id.
184. 418 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Va. 1976).
185. 705 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1983).
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the right to terminate the contract and seek damages on the basis of
anticipatory repudiation."8 6
In a preliminary comment to a revision to section 2-209, NCCUSL
drafters endorsed the approach taken in the Roth case without explanatory
commentary.187 This approach places a heavy burden on the defendant, and
may result in enforcement in some cases despite the absence of a
commercially viable reason for the modification.
Similarly, in Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 8 the New York
Court of Appeals refused to enforce a modification, finding that the seller
unfairly coerced the buyer to increase the price of component parts that the
buyer needed for a contract with the Navy. The court focused on the
inability of the buyer to obtain the goods from other dependable suppliers,
holding that the seller's threat to stop delivery of materials absent a price
adjustment deprived the buyer of free will. Because the buyer needed the
parts to produce sophisticated military machinery for the Navy to the
"strictest engineering standards,"'8' 9 the court found it would be
unreasonable to require the buyer to cover with parts from other dealers not
on its approved list.
The absence of an objective commercial reason for demanding a
modification may also provide a basis for refusal to enforce. In T & S Brass
& Bronze Works, Inc. v. Pic-Air, Inc., 9 the court refused to regard a delay
in production as a legitimate commercial reason for the seller's
modification that shifted air freight charges to the buyer. The court based
its decision on the fact that the seller, after ordering production to begin,
had twice assured the buyer that the installments would be delivered on
time. The court held that the buyer's failure to object at the time the seller
sought the modification did not preclude its subsequent objection because
the seller had no legitimate commercial reason for modifying the contract.
In Ralston Purina Co. v. McNabb, 9' the Tennessee Supreme Court
refused to enforce a modification, holding that the purchaser (Ralston)
knew or should have known that the defendant would not be able to
complete his contract and that the modification would result in
compounding plaintiff's damages. The plaintiff-purchaser alleged that
defendant-seller failed to deliver 3,000 bushels due under two contracts.
186. Farnsworth notes that a demand for modification accompanied by a statement that the
party seeking the modification will not perform absent assent to that modification constitutes an
anticipatory repudiation. See FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1999). Even though the
concession sought by the party demanding modification "may be a minor one, the breach that it
threatens in order to extract it is not." Id.
187. U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. I (proposed NCCUSL draft, Dec. 1, 1998).
188. 272 N.E.2d 533 (N.Y. 1971).
189. Id. at 537.
190. 790 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 1985).
191. 381 F. Supp. 181 (W.D. Tenn. 1974).
2001]
HeinOnline  -- 53 Fla. L. Rev. 91 2001
FLORDA LAW RVI[EW
After the seller made a short delivery, the plaintiff-buyer sent letters of
extension to the defendant, and defendant made eleven additional
deliveries, leaving 771 bushels undelivered. Each time the plaintiff-buyer
offered to extend the contract, the defendant indicated his acceptance of the
extension by delivering soybeans after the date of the offer and accepting
the contract price although the market price was then higher. The plaintiff
demanded $11,000 as cover damage under T.C.A. 47-2-713. The defendant
asserted that damages should be calculated as of the last date set for
performance. Also, the defendant contended that by urging the defendant
to accept an extension, plaintiff had failed the good faith test because the
extensions allowed the plaintiff to maximize damages in anticipation of a
foreseeable rise in prices. Refusing to uphold the modification, the court
held that the purchaser (Ralston) knew or should have known that the
defendant would not be able to complete his contract. It refused
recognition of Ralston's modifying agreements that would compound its
damages. Based on this reasoning, the court calculated damages as of the
November deadline and refused to give effect to the modified delivery
dates.
C. Critique of the Cases
The declaration of a court that the good faith of a party requires the
enforcement of a modification or that the lack of good faith of a party
justifies a refusal to enforce the modification does little more than declare
the winner of the controversy. This brief sampling of cases illustrates the
variety of approaches employed by courts to assess modification claims
and demonstrates the various facts that can capture the attention of
advocates and courts in this area. The cases suggest that courts ordinarily
enforce a modification if the parties agreed to modify in circumstances that
establish a reason for the modification outside the control of the parties.
Nevertheless, uncertainty inheres in the decisional law. In cases that do not
fit neatly into the categories of coercion or a modification based on a
change of circumstances, a significant risk exists that a court will enforce
a modification without a showing of justifying circumstances. A party
facing a demand for a modification has little guidance from the courts
regarding whether his capitulation to the demand will be a basis for
enforcement or not. While judicial discretion is indispensable in contract
law, the nebulous nature of the modification test has resulted in
inconsistent treatment. The wide range of tests192 used to assess
192. Agroindustrias Vezel v. H.P. Schmid, Inc., No. 92-15078, 1994 WL 12342, at *3 (9th
Cir. Jan. 18, 1994) (holding that claim of economic duress hinges on showing of a wrongful act
"sufficiently coercive to cause a reasonably prudent person faced with no reasonable alternative to
succumb to the perpetrator's pressure"); T & S Brass, 790 F.2d at 1106 (holding that failure of
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modifications suggests the need for clarification, and the conclusory nature
of the test encourages a non-systematic approach to modification cases.
VII. THE SEQUENTIAL APPROACH
A sequential test presents a mix of procedural 93 and substantive
elements,"' requiring first that the initiating party demonstrate areasonable
ground for seeking a modification, such as a change of circumstances
creating a new and unallocated burden. If the initiating party successfully
establishes such a reason for the modification, the court should grant
enforcement unless the defendant can show that plaintiff's request was
coercive. This test provides a more specific rule and may yield a better mix
of stability and flexibility in modifications.
Buyer to object to modification does not preclude subsequent objection when Seller had no
legitimate commercial reason for modifying); Wisconsin Knife Works v. Nat'l Metal Crafters, 781
F.2d 1280, 1287 (7th Cir. 1986) (requiring a showing of reliance by plaintiff to enforce the oral
modification of a contract as waiver of written modification requirement and announcing a need
for a showing of bad faith to defeat modification); Jamestown Farmers Elevator v. Gen. Mills, Inc.,
522 F.2d 1285, 1290 (8th Cir. 1977) (requiring economic duress to overcome modification and
reasoning business compulsion is more than a mere threat which might result in injury at some
future time); Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. United States, 656 F.2d 650, 653-54 (U.S. Ct. CI. 1981)
(holding that economic pressure to modify a contract does not rise to the level of economic duress
when plaintiff makes no showing of dependence upon supply or impact upon business and
reasonable alternatives to the modification are available); United States ex rel. Crane Co. v.
ProgressiveEnter., Inc., 418 F. Supp. 662,664 (E.D. Va. 1976) (holdingamodification enforceable
when request for the modification was justified by Seller's increased cost and that Buyer engaged
in bad faith conduct when refusing to pay the adjusted price for goods received); Business
Incentives Co. v. Sony Corp., 397 F. Supp. 63, 69-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (finding economic duress
must be proven to be the result of the defendant's conduct and not that of the plaintiff's necessities);
Ralston Purina Co. v. McNabb, 381 F. Supp. 181, 183 (W.D. Tenn. 1974) (holding modification
that results in compounding injury to Seller is not in good faith and is unenforceable by purchaser
who knows or should know that Seller would not be able to complete the contract); Lumber Enters.,
Inc. v. Hansen, 846 P.2d 1046, 1049 (Mont. 1993) (holding a modification reasonable where
inexperienced Seller, after performing on a contract for one year, determined that the original
contract price was below production costs); Austin Instrument, 272 N.E. at 536-37 (holding that
agreement to increase price of equipment was unfairly coerced where Buyer was unable to obtain
goods from other reliable source).
193. The procedural aspect of this test turns on the fact that Plaintiff bears the initial burden
of showing a good faith reason for modification. If Plaintiff fails to carry this burden, the court need
not inquire further and should dismiss the action based on Plaintiff's failure to establish this point.
Similarly, Professor Hillman proposed that courts should entertain a presumption against
modification when the capitulating party suffered a material loss from the original contract. See
Hillman, supra note 9, at 884.
194. The substantive aspect of this test involves the court'sjudgment regarding the sufficiency
of the plaintiff's proof to establish a reasonable ground for modification. This test necessarily
involves ajudgment by the court that the reasonable ground asserted is sufficient and was advanced
by the plaintiff in good faith.
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Generally, parties may allocate risks under the contract. For example,
if the parties allocate the risk of a rise in the price of materials necessary
for the production of goods to Seller, a rise in price of those materials
would not provide a reasonable ground for modification. Similarly, parties
can provide their own rules in the contract relating to modification- to the
common sense limits of good faith. The comments provided below indicate
that the sequential approach is contractible rather than mandatory. In
attempting to level the playing field for the non-initiating party, the
provision should avoid creating new obligations on the part of that party.
For example, a provision that creates a duty on the non-initiating party to
consider a request and make a judgment or respond to the request for
modification should also consider the consequence of the non-initiating
party's failure to act. A system that pushes the parties toward resolving
their differences together rather than resorting to judicial resolution
enhances efficiency. It would work an injustice, however, to insert greater
uncertainty for the parties regarding the rights of a party in responding to
a modification request. Similarly, a complicated provision may create
unfairness by advantaging a party who is particularly savvy or who
happens to be represented by savvy counsel.'95
A. Proposed Text and Comments
The following proposed text and accompanying comments are modeled
on section 2-609 and the official comments to that provision.' 96 They
present a new approach to modification under section 2-209(1). This
approach simply presents one way of framing a sequential test for
195. Karl Liewellyn, one of the primary drafters of Article 2, took seriously concerns about
processes that favored wealthy litigants. In a statement to ajoint meeting of ALT and NCCUSL on
the topic of whether records should be kept of the various drafts of Article 2, Llewllyn made the
following statement:
We [the Editorial Board] have been worried to the bottom of our souls by the
conception of the use of the successive drafts of this Code as a guide to legislative
intent. If you will remember that the Code in one form or another has been under
heavy consideration for more than five years, with a prior five years of preliminary
work on one of the articles, you can see that the course of successive drafts would
be a course of confusion, of trouble and, as I see it, of tremendous advantage to
the wealthy litigant over the non-wealthy litigant whose lawyer could not afford
to spend the time or take the necessary trips to where collections of this material
could be found.
THE KARL LLEwELLYN PAPERS: A GUIDE TO THE CoLLECrTON (R. Ellinwood & W. Twining, rev.
ed. 1970).
196. The provision relating to assurances of performance is section 2-711 under NCUSSL's
proposed revision. It is substantially similar to the approach taken in section 2-609.
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modification contests. It is not intended to supplant or affect subsequent
provisions of the modification provision (section 2-209(2)-(5), or the
Code's approach to the right to assurances of performance (section 2-609).
Another alternative would be to merge the modification treatment into
section 2-609. Like most UCC provisions, the requirements of this section
may be changed by express declaration of the parties unless their changes
would violate fundamental rights or abrogate the obligation of good faith.
Language imported verbatim from section 2-609 and section 2-209 appears
in regular font. Changes and additions to the language suggested to
conform the principles to the modification context are in italics.
§ 2-209. Right to Request Modification
(1) An agreement modifying a contract within this Article
needs no consideration to be binding. However, a contract for
sale imposes an obligation on each party that the other's
expectation of receiving due performance will not be
impaired. When reasonable grounds for modification arise
with respect to the performance of either party, that party may
in writing request a modification. Until the parties resolve the
issue of modification (for example, by agreeing to modify, by
continuing under the original agreement, or by settlement)
either party may, if commercially reasonable, suspend any
performance when that party has not already received the
agreed return. Between merchants the reasonableness of
grounds for modification and the adequacy of the request
shall be determined according to commercial standards. 1"
OFFICIAL COMMENT
Purposes:
1. The section rests on the recognition that (1) the essential purpose of
a contract between commercial entities is actual performance; (2) the
parties do not bargain merely for a promise, or for a promise plus the right
to win a lawsuit; and (3) a continuing sense of reliance and security that the
promised performance will be forthcoming when due is an important
feature of the bargain. If either the willingness or the ability of a party to
perform declines materially between the time of contracting and the time
for performance, the other party is threatened with the loss of a substantial
part of what he has bargained for." 8 The unwillingness or inability of a
197. Combination of text from U.C.C. §§ 2-209, 2-609 with proposed revisions added in
italics.
198. The party receiving a modification request is, in the words of the comment to section 2-
609, "threatened with the loss of a substantial part of what he has bargained for" by the implicit
threat of non-performance. U.C.C. § 2-609 cmt. 1 (1998). Indeed, the request to modify is likely
to create more profound insecurity than that presented in the assurance area since there the
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party to perform has application to the context of modification. If the
circumstances upon which the contract is predicated change significantly,
the party affected by the changed circumstances may be justified in seeking
a change in the contract terms. In such a case, the initiating party may
request a modification. In contracting, parties may designate the types of
changes in circumstances that justify modification. By doing so, parties
allocate the risks under the contract. Additionally, nothing in this section
prevents or limits a promisee from volunteering a modification to benefit
promisor. An example would be a volunteered modification to share an
increased cost that would otherwise fall on the promisor.
2. Measures have been adopted to meet the needs of commercial
entities in such situations. First, each party is permitted to suspend his own
performance and any preparation therefor, with excuse for any resulting
necessary delay, until the situation has been clarified. "Suspend
performance" under this section means to hold up performance pending the
outcome of the request to modify and includes also the holding up of any
preparatory action. Second, the parties are given the right to assess the
effect of the change of circumstances on the rights and duties of each
under the contract. When held within the limits of reasonableness and good
faith, this procedure actually expresses no more than the fair business
meaning of any commercial contract, which the parties may designate or
alter by contract within the limits ofgoodfaith. The present section merges
these pfinciples' of law and commercial practice into a single theory of
general application to all sales agreements looking to future performance
and connects the issues of modification and those of the closely related
area of demand for adequate assurance of performance. The effect of a
request for adequate assurances of performance is to be determined by
reference to section 2-609.
3. Subsection (2) of the section requires that "reasonable" grounds as
used in subsection (1) be defined by commercial rather than legal
standards. The express reference to commercial standards carries no
connotation that the obligation of good faith is not equally applicable here.
Rather, this provision provides guidance on what constitutes goodfaith in
the context of modification. In this context, the good faith requirement
demands that modifications should be denied enforcement absent either
some change in circumstances that provides a reasonable ground for the
request or a party's reasonable reliance on a promise to modify the
contract. This provision substitutes the standard of "reasonable grounds"
for the more general standard of "goodfaith, " requiring a change outside
insecurity springs from some source other than the declarations of the obligor.
199. Like the comments to section 2-609, this comment refer to "measures" and, additionally,
to "principles," to refer back to the measures a party may undertake in this context. U.C.C. § 2-609
cmt. 2.
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the control of the promisee to enforce a modification. The case of a price
increase provides an example. A party who enters a contract to sell
widgets for $5.00 per hundred and later urges a modification of the
contract price to $6.00 per hundredfor no reason other than the desire for
a higher price has not sought a good faith modification. This result is
different in the area of modification than in the area of original contract
formation. Seller has a right to reject an offer of $5.00 per hundred and to
urge a contract price of $6.00 per hundred for the sole reason that he
wishes to obtain a higher price. The freedom to demand More is
constrained, however, once the parties commit to a contract. Seller is
bound to sellfor the price of the original contract ($5. 00 per hundred) and
he can no longer assert his desire for a higher price for its own sake.
Under commercial standards and in accord with commercial practice, a
ground for modification must arise from or be directly related to the
contract in question. If the obstacle to performance is sufficiently
significant, the obligor has a non-frivolous argument that he should be
excused under the doctrines of mistake or impracticability and a request
for modification is justified. A request may also be justified based on a
change that does not constitute legal excuse. The fact that a court
ultimately holds that the doctrine of mistake is not applicable should not
resolve the modification question. For an example outside the sale of
goods setting, see Watkins & Sons v. Carrig, 21 A.2d 591 (N.H. 1941).
4. What constitutes reasonable grounds for modification is subject to
the test of factual conditions. For example, a party's attempt to secure
some new benefit or to transfer some risk to the other party by means of a
modification, fails the reasonable grounds test.200 When plaintiff-obligee
establishes a reasonable ground, the burden shifts to the obligor to show
that his assent to the modification resultedfrom economic coercion by the
obligee.
5. The rule set forth here is devised to balance the rights of the parties
when one demands a modification. It would create too rigorous a test to
construe reasonable grounds to require the party requesting a change to
prove excuse of performance under the doctrines of impracticability,
mistake or frustration.201
200. Under the sequential approach, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing his reason for
seeking a change in the contract he now seeks to enforce. Accordingly, if there is a gap in the facts
on this point, the plaintiff cannot carry his burden and the suit will be dismissed. This may seem
a harsh result until one realizes that the plaintiff initiated the modification, inevitably has access to
information regarding the need for the modification, and stands to benefit from the modification.
201. U.C.C. § 2-209 (proposed revisions added in italics).
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B. Reasons for Modeling the Approach on Section 2-609
Section 2-609 is particularly well-suited to serve as a model for the
treatment of modification. This section has more in common with section
2-209 than meets the eye under the current arrangement of the Code.
Section 2-609 deals with uncertainty about another's willingness or ability
to perform. Section 2-209 deals with the flip side of the coin: uncertainty
about one's own ability or willingness to perform. Additionally, in the
"what goes around" world of contract law, section 2-609 and section 2-209
are intimately intertwined. When a party states a desire to modify, the other
party is made insecure by the request. The request to modify may include
an implicit threat that the initiating party will not perform without the
modification. If such a threat is explicitly disavowed, the request for
modification loses much of its force. Few people would agree to modify
when the requesting party makes clear that she will go forward with
performance as promised if the other refuses to modify.2°2 Thus, it is likely
that a recalcitrant party who refuses to accede to the modification will also
demand assurances of performance from the initiating party pursuant to
UCC § 2-609. The power of the non-initiating party under section 2-609
evens the balance of power to some extent. Moreover, use of section 2-609
may develop facts that will assist a court in determining whether a request
for modification includes an explicit or implied threat of breach or generate
other evidence useful to a court in determining whether the initiating party
was coercive.203 Courts have held that a request for modification coupled
with an explicit threat not to perform constitutes anticipatory
repudiation,2°ajustifying the non-initiating party in terminating the contract
202. Applying this point to the introductory hypothetical, it is likely that Seller's request for
a higher price will give rise to insecurity on the part of Purchaser (Madison County). A court may
find that this insecurity justifies a demand by Purchaser of written assurances of performances.
203. See Roth Steel Prods. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 705 F.2d 134, 148 (6th Cir. 1983); Guzzello
v. Venteau, 789 F. Supp. 112, 117 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (recognizing anticipatory repudiation based
on "unlawful increase" in price and coercion).
204. Courts hold that a demand for modification coupled with the threat of breach absent
acceptance of the modification constitutes anticipatory repudiation. See WBZE, Inc. v. Arab
Network of Am., 220 B.R. 568, 572 (D. Md. 1998) (noting that demand of performance not
required by contract coupled with statement that party will not render performance unless demand
is met constitutes anticipatory repudiation); Humphrey v. Placid Oil Co., 142 F. Supp. 246, 254
(E.D. Tex. 1956) (holding that Defendant's statement that it would not perform contract unless
Plaintiff agreed to additional terms constituted anticipatory repudiation); Twenty-Four Collection,
Inc. v. M. Weinbaum Constr. Inc., 427 So. 2d 1110, 1111-12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (holding
that demand for modification coupled with threat to walk offjob was anticipatory repudiation); see
also Bill's Coal Co. v. Board of Pub. Utils. of Springfield, 682 F.2d 883, 886 (10th Cir. 1982)
(noting that bad faith urging of erroneous interpretation to hold other in a contract does not
constitute anticipatory repudiation).
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or urging the breaching party to retract the repudiation.20 5 In such a
circumstance, the initiating party has a choice: he can provide assurances
that he will perform as originally promised and proceed with performance
or he may repudiate the contract (breaching by anticipatory repudiation)
and defend on the doctrines of impossibility or mistake.
Section 2-609 deals with the issue of uncertainty in media res,
providing a step-by-step roadmap for dealing with uncertainty when it
arises. Despite the striking similarity of the settings of modification and
assurances of performance, section 2-209 addresses uncertainty in a post
hoc fashion, stating a test that applies only after a modification is
challenged in court. The Code comments to section 2-209 and section 2-
609 give no reason for providing more guidance in the assurances setting
than in the modification setting.
A party to a contract has no right to demand assurances from the other
party unless circumstances create a reasonable ground for insecurity
regarding whether the other will perform.2" This right to assurance is
constrained not only by the required showing that reasonable grounds for
the insecurity exist, but also by the requirement of a written demand by the
insecure party. Thus, the general rule (no right to assurances) is modified
in limited circumstances. 2° By contrast, section 2-209 does not insert itself
into the process of modification. The current version of section 2-209 and
that proposed by NCCUSL take the post hoc perspective of the time of
trial, judging the decision after the parties have acted. Unlike section 2-
609, this approach fails to give guidance to parties as they deal with the
problem. Moreover, it engenders the current dichotomous approach to
resolving the enforcement cases, creating uncertainty regarding whether
modifications are enforceable and heightening the likelihood of demands
for modifications.20 8
205. See Gaglia v. Kirchner, 721 A.2d 1028, 1031 (N.J. 1999) (finding that a statement by
purchaser's attorney that he would not approve signed contract but would approve with
modifications constituted anticipatory repudiation, justifying injured party in treating the
communication as a termination or urging breaching party to retract the repudiation).
206. See UCC § 2-609; Smyers v. Quartz Works Corp., 880 F. Supp. 1425, 1433-34 (D. Kan.
1995).
207. See U.C.C. § 2-609.
208. Section 2-609 also specifies the standard by which courts shouldjudge the reasonableness
of the insecure party's actions. Subsection (2) states that "[b]etween merchants the reasonableness
of grounds for insecurity and the adequacy of any assurance offered shall be determined according
to commercial standards." Id. The objective standard created by section 2-609 for judging the
relative rights of the parties when post-contractual issues arise would be equally effective in the area
of modification.
HeinOnline  -- 53 Fla. L. Rev. 99 2001
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
C. Application of the Sequential Approach to Typical Defenses
One way to assess the usefulness of the suggested approach is to
consider how it would affect the typical defenses discussed earlier in this
article.2" The following discussion takes up each of the defenses explored
above, considering how the sequential approach would be dealt with in
each setting.210
1. Credibility Issues
In the first category, the defendant denies that the parties agreed to a
modification. Although a credibility dispute can arise under any test, a
statutory provision (like section 2-609) requiring that the initiating party
make its request in writing provides some evidence of the modification
sought. Under the sequential approach, it is likely that a plaintiff will
identify and preserve evidence of the ground asserted by setting forth the
basis for the change in the written modification request required by the
statute.2 11 A recalcitrant may, despite the documentation, argue that the
parties did not reach final agreement on the modification sought by
Plaintiff. It cannot argue effectively, however, that no modification was
sought by Plaintiff. Because evidence is available to prove that the claim
rests on a real transaction between the parties, a recalcitrant's ability to
argue that Plaintiff is manufacturing the claim out of whole cloth is
limited.
2. The Defense of No Reasonable Ground
The second category of defenses is presented when defendant claims
that plaintiff lacked good faith (or a reasonable ground) to seek the
modification. The sequential testjudges this claim head-on by requiring the
plaintiff to establish proof of the change of circumstances that gave rise to
its request for modification. In a context as specific as modification, the
conduct required to comport with the good faith standard is identifiable.2 2
Rather than employing the generalized and amorphous test of good faith,
the sequential approach achieves greater precision by stating the standard
for good faith in this particular context, i.e., a written request based on a
reasonable ground for the modification.
209. See supra Part II. D.
210. See supra Part II. D.
211. Hawkland suggests that a writing should be required for modifications. See HAWKLAND,
supra note 132.
212. See supra Part III.
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3. The Defense of Coercion
The third category of defenses is presented when defendant claims that
Plaintiff coerced Defendant's assent to the modification sought. The
sequential approach gives needed context to this inquiry as well. It places
the burden on Defendant to show coercive conduct on the part of Plaintiff.
The sequential approach focuses the inquiry of the court by specifying the
burden for each party and establishing the initial need of the modifying
party to establish the reasonable grounds for the modification.
D. Application of the Sequential Approach to
Representative Hypotheticals
Applying the sequential analysis to the introductory hypothetical and
other hypotheticals clarifies the effect of the sequential test and allows easy
comparison of the test with the current scheme under section 2-209. While
other circumstances of modifications may occur, the four situations set
forth below address typical concerns in this area of law.
1. The Steel Perfect Hypothetical
If the request for a modification made by Steel Perfect (Seller) was
based on an unforeseen and unallocated increase in the market price of iron
that gave rise to a good faith belief in Seller that it had a basis for refusing
to perform, Seller's circumstances seem to present a reasonable ground for
seeking modification. If, on the other hand, no price increase had actually
occurred or Steel Perfect accepted the risk of the price increase at the time
of contracting, Steel Perfect lacked a reasonable ground for seeking the
modification.
If Madison County (Buyer) rejected Seller's request and Seller then
refused to perform, a court will not force the modification on the parties,
even if Seller had a reasonable ground for requesting the change. If Buyer
rejects the modification and Seller does not perform, Buyer may seek
damages for the Seller's breach by nonperformance. If the court finds that
Seller had reasonable grounds for a modification that constituted legal
excuse under the doctrines of mistake or impossibility, a court will excuse
Seller's performance. Thus, the initiating party who seeks a modification
based on a reasonable ground (such as mistake or impossibility) has
protection against the recalcitrant party's refusal to modify. Refusing to
perform is, nevertheless, a second best choice because the initiating party
prefers to continue with the contract in a modified form. If a court finds
that Seller's request, though reasonable, did not amount to legal excuse by
mistake or impossibility, it should grant Buyer (injured party) damages for
Seller's refusal to perform.
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2. A Hypothetical Based on Reliance
on a Promise of Enhanced Performance
As in the area of enforcement of original contracts, a plaintiffs reliance
on a gratuitous promise may provide a basis for enforcement of a
modification.2 3 Restatement section 90 and many jurisdictions extend
protection to promisees who rely on a promise that meets the requirements
of this section without regard to whether the promise arises as part of a
new transaction or as part of a modification. Reasonable reliance may arise
from circumstances in which a party relies on promises of his contracting
partner to give some additional benefits not encompassed within the
original bargain. For example, if Seller agreed to modify a contract by
promising to provide seasonal packaging for goods (such as a red, holiday
bow), Seller should be held to the promise if Buyer relied, for example by
purchasing the packaging materials-even though the modifying promise
was gratuitous. Applying this principle to the introductory hypothetical, if
Seller relies on Buyer's promise to pay the higher price by continuing to
manufacture the goods and ultimately delivering the goods to Buyer, a
court may enforce the Buyer's promise to pay the higher price if it finds
this reliance was reasonable. It is unlikely, however, that a court would
find a party's reliance reasonable if that party coerced the modification or
used the modification to gain a benefit or to transfer a burden to the other
party.
3. A Hypothetical Based on Reliance on a
Promise Reducing a Performance Burden
Reasonable reliance may also arise from circumstances in which a party
relies on promises of his contracting partner to lessen a burden or forgive
an element of performance. For example, Seller may have timing problems
that would require overtime or other expenses to deliver goods on time.
Suppose that Seller called Buyer, explained that the promised delivery
would increase his costs dramatically, and Buyer gave assurances that
delivery on the following Monday would be acceptable. In the event of a
price decline during the interim, Buyer might claim that Seller repudiated
the contract by not delivering on time. If Buyer makes a substitute purchase
and claims repudiation, the court should scrutinize Seller's reliance on the
promise, holding Buyer to the extension of the delivery time. Although the
difficulty relating to Seller's performance (i.e., the expense of overtime
workers) might not justify excuse of performance based on impossibility
or mistake, Seller's reliance on the modification should provide a basis for
213. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). The protection of this section
provides a basis for enforcement for promises that are original or modifications.
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enforcement without requiring a reasonable ground for modifying.
Arguably, Seller's reliance in such a case is reasonable because the
accommodation was treated by the parties as negligible and not of
sufficient importance to disturb the allocation of benefits of the original
contract.
4. A Hypothetical Based on Bad Faith
of the Capitulating Party
Although good faith of the capitulating party is not an element to be
established to enforce a modification, clear bad faith on the part of the
capitulating party may be taken into account in comparing the conduct of
the two parties. The capitulating party may be acting in bad faith even
when the initiating party lacked a reason for modification. For example, at
the time of a modification, the capitulating party may intend to refuse to
perform the contract as modified. In such a case, the initiating party may
have an action against the non-initiating party based on promissory
fraud.214
Assume the defendant agreed to the modification only to insure that
plaintiff would perform, never intending to live up to the change. Each
party alleges the other acted wrongfully: (1) Defendant alleges that the
Plaintiff sought an unjustified modification and (2) Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant's assent was a misrepresentation of his intentions. This situation
calls for a court to compare the conduct of the two parties. If the
modification resulted in the parties sharing a burden created by an
unforeseen and unallocated obstacle rather than simply improving the deal
for the initiating party, the reliance of the plaintiff on the modified contract
seems reasonable. In other words, the initiating party's reliance on the
promise of the capitulating party is reasonable when the net effect is for the
parties to share an unforeseen and unallocated burden. Conversely, it is
unlikely that the initiating party's reliance is reasonable if the modification
shifts a burden originally allocated to the initiating party or shifts a benefit
allocated to the non-initiating party.
214. See Tejani v. Allied Princess Bay Co., 204 A.2d 618, 620 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)
(recognizing an action based on modifying agreement with intent to defraud); Fraught v. Norvell,
258 P.2d 642, 644 (Okla. 1953) (rejecting Plaintiff's claim of promissory fraud based on failure to
show that, at the time of contracting, defendant intended not to perform); Tran v. Tehrani, 781 P.2d
393, 394 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (requiring, as element of fraud, intent not to perform at time of
contract modification). Similarly, the initiating party may be guilty of promissory fraud if at the time
she entered the original contract, she intended to seek a modification.
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E. Comparison of the Sequential Approach
and the Current Approach
In applying a sequential standard to judge a modification, courts still
face the question of fairness, but, under this standard, the inquiry has more
specificity and substance. It is informed by the standards for such obstacles
and burdens developed in the area of excuse of performance.215 Some
courts would undoubtedly engage in the sequential analysis described here
as a matter of common sense. Even so, adoption of a sequential approach
and its methodical assessment of the rights of each party may facilitate
modification cases. Focusing initially on the reason the initiating party
sought a modification encourages the party contemplating a modification
to restrict his choices to situations in which he had reasonable grounds to
modify-or at least a good faith belief in his grounds. If the party lacks
confidence in its ability to convince a court that it should be entitled to
modify, it is likely to go forward with performance as agreed rather than
seeking a modification. The sequential approach is an improvement over
the current regime of a generalized good faith inquiry because its more
specific and reliable test discourages parties from seeking to modify
contract obligations without a demonstrable change in circumstances.
Although the reasonable grounds test provides a larger scope than that of
legal excuse, this larger scope is justified because it allows the party
assessing the offer to determine whether going forward with performance
as modified prevents an inefficient breach. In other words, although the
initiating party ultimately fails to establish legal excuse, the modification
should be deemed enforceable if the initiating party held a non-frivolous
belief that the change in circumstances presented a basis for a refusal to
perform. Like the law of settlement, the offeror's good faith belief in the
offer is requisite to judicial enforcement.
VIII. CONCLUSION
A clash of competing principles or paradigms is not an unusual
phenomenon in the law.216 The conflicting principles at work in the
215. Modification can be seen as an appropriate self-help remedy in which the parties employ
the reasoning of the areas of mistake and impossibility and construct a new contract. See Christine
Jolls, Contracts as Bilateral Commitments: A New Perspective on Contract Modification, 26 J.
LEGALSTUD. 203, 224-27 (1987) (arguing that modification represents an inappropriate self-help
remedy circumventing damages rules). But see Subha Barasimhan, Modification: The Self-Help
Specific Performance Remedy, 97 YALE L.J. 61, 77-94 (1987) (examining modification as a self-
help remedy and arguing that modification must be integrated within the system of legal remedies
for contract breach).
216. Paradigms pervade the law, as well as scientific reasoning, providing an ordering
mechanism. In his study ofthe scientific method, THESTRUCTUREOFSCIENTIFICREVOLUTIONS (2d
ed. 1970), Thomas Kuhn explores the use of the paradigm in science, comparing it to tests or
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modification area reflect strong and recurring themes in contract
enforcement. The laissez-faire provision of private ordering predominant
in American contract law underlies the idea that courts should enforce
modifications absent coercion. On the other hand, the evaluation of the
fairness of a modification is also consistent with private ordering. A
requirement that Plaintiff make an affirmative showing of fairness (i.e.,
that he had a reasonable ground for seeking a modification) preserves the
original expectations of the parties and prevents the destabilizing influence
of unpoliced modifications. Thus, the sequential test allocates the burden
of proof initially to the plaintiff and shifts the burden to the defendant only
when the plaintiff establishes that it had a reasonable ground for seeking
the modification.
Law that is difficult to apply is difficult to predict and is also likely to
result in indeterminancy and dissonance in both the courts and the
marketplace. The current approach to the modification arealeads to a range
of tests and comparisons of the conduct of the parties. A sequential
approach, by contrast, proceeds methodically to consider each step of the
modification process in order. First, it supplants the vague good faith
standard with the standard of reasonable grounds, fastening the court's
attention on the situation of the initiating party and requiring that party to
establish its need to modify. Second, it requires the creation of a writing by
the initiating party, providing some evidence of the conduct of the parties.
In this context, the nature of the test in media res helps inform the
judgment of parties regarding how the conduct of each will be judged by
a court after the fact. Third, the test turns to the capitulating party, allowing
that party to defend on the ground of coercion when the circumstances
compelling the defendant to act are traceable to the plaintiff. Thus, the
sequential approach provides guidance for the decision-making by parties
as well by courts.
In its current state of development, the good faith standard of section
2-209 seems to operate merely as a label for the outcome chosen by a
court. Like many areas which require good faith, the modification area
presents a need for balancing the interests of the parties and calls for
sensitive application by judges. While application of any test must depend
on the practical wisdom of judges, the analysis of good faith can be made
more predictable and straight-forward in a particularized context such as
models set forth in judicial decisions. The use of paradigms in judicial reasoning has been noted
by many scholars. E.g., Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The Normal
Science ofAmerican Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1213, 1216-19 (1998). Thebenefit of models
carries with it a detriment, however. The narrow focus of a paradigm carries the risk of over-
simplification. In fact, the bounded nature of paradigms may be part of the reason the law often
raises up twin or competing paradigms, allowing courts to choose the competing reality that it
believes most appropriately applies to the circumstances in a given case.
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modification. A test that expressly requires a showing of a reasonable
ground for modification focuses on the minimum of good faith in this
context. The sequential approach also sharpens the test, minimizes the
importance of advocacy, and makes clear to a party pressing for a
modification that it bears a risk. Like the decisions to terminate or to
demand assurances, the determination to seek a modification should not be
undertaken lightly, particularly if the modification sought significantly
changes the baseline of the contract. A party who seeks a modification in
such circumstances-like the party who demands assurances of
performance or terminates a contract-should bear the initial burden of
convincing the court that it acted on reasonable grounds. 7 In cases where
a modification benefits one party and creates a detriment for the other, the
sequential approach provides a more dependable test than the current good
faith standard of the Code. Such an approach is in harmony with the
Code's consistent theme of commercial reasonableness and gives
appropriate consideration to the dual needs of certainty and flexibility in
this area of law.
217. See Walker & Co. v. Harrison, 81 N.W.2d 352, 355 (Mich. 1957) (noting that the
determination by one party to repudiate a contract is "fraught with peril" because the court in the
claim of its contemplation may not agree that the other had breached first).
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